NOTE: THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNFORMATED TEXT FILE. LECTURES 2 - 8 LECTURE # 2: "A SYSTEMS THEORY OF DYSFUNCTIONAL AMERICA." (What do I mean by "America", "American Democracy", and "Dying"?) The outrageous assertion that America may be dying carries an obligation to conduct a thorough examination, with sound theoretical analysis, of our national health. In this lecture, I want to explain first what I mean by the terms "America", "American democracy", and "dying". Then, I will develop a conceptual framework-systems theory and a diagrammatic model-incorporating the dynamics of my "dying" proposition. .............................. "AMERICA": A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. My conception of "America" does not fit any simple geographic, legalistic, or jurisdictional definition. It does not mean "the government". Nor is it a shorthand reference to the United States of America. I use the term "America", as did Tocqueville, connotatively, to express the subjective character as well as the objective parameters of the system within which "we, the people of the United States" conduct our public affairs. My connotational definition is based on the notion that America has always been an idea as much as a thing. America is not just the United States, or the President, or the Capitol, or the 260 million people in far-flung territory over which our flag flies. These are only representative parts of our corporeal body. In addition to this corporeal body, I am talking about something different, something bigger, something special-an almost spiritual America. .............................. My America is what Tocqueville billed as "the great experiment ... a spectacle for which the world has not been prepared by the history of the past" (Chapter I of Vol. 11). My America is the unprecedented pursuit of civic freedom, equality, and justice through a precarious framework of popular self-government. My America is a national experiment in democratic ideals. At the risk of being boringly repetitive, I want to emphasize the essential elements of our Great Experiment. First, and perhaps of most historic importance, America represents a unique case of inspired nationhood; a hodge-podge of New World people rejected the Old World and voluntarily joined together as a nation. They even put it in writing-in effect, "We the people...are all in this together". Second, to a great extent, America was based on enlightened theoretical principles-democratic ideals-rather than monarchical, religious, ethnic, economic, geographic, or historic considerations. Third, the new American nation attempted to implement these democratic ideals through a strange, new experiment with limited, representative governance. These essential elements of our national democratic experiment have withstood challenging tests of war and peace and time, finding expression in the definitive struggles and documents of American history. Perhaps no nobler expression of America's generalized democratic ideals exists than the opening, universal principle of our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Substantively instructive is our collective national commitment as expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution: "We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Personally meaningful for each of us is that special feeling we experience at some time or another when we recite the Pledge of Allegiance to our flag and our republic: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." I could go on forever-Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, FDR's fireside chats, Martin Luther King's "I have a dream..."; Kennedy's "Ask not what your country can do for you..."-our experiment certainly sparkles with familiar words of inspirational national purpose. Of course, those familiar words are fuzzy philosophical inspirations; in practice they present complexities and contradictions. Inevitably, "freedom" and "equality" defy easy conceptualization and operationalization; and quite often they clash. For example, is our self-evident truth one of opportunity or one of fairness? Is our society one of freedom, individualism, and independence or one of egalitarian security? How do we balance our democratic ideals when freedom of speech conflicts with freedom of religion? What do we do when the news media insist upon disseminating information that damages an accused citizen's ability to get a fair trial? Is it possible to resolve these legitimate democratic contradictions without endangering our treasured ideals and principles of governance? How do we deal with the fact that implementing these democratic ideals and principles sometimes leads us toward undemocratic and anti-democratic outcomes? Can we make the Great Experiment work despite its fuzziness and our own self-destructive inclinations? In truth, our Great Experiment has been a spectacular national march, for more than two centuries, by a diverse people, toward universally positive principles of democratic society-such as liberty, equality, and justice. In the process, our experiment also has secured the material benefits of democracy for generation after generation of American citizens. This unprecedented, often circuitous march has led us through war, constitutional crisis, executive-legislative-judicial struggle, economic depression, social unrest, and much public soul-searching. It has been, and always will be, a fitful journey of competing visions and real political danger. ............................. America's Great Experiment, then, as I see it, is a philosophical and practical exercise in national, democratic self-government, a procedural and substantive exercise designed to answer an important sequential question: (1) Can..., (2) How can..., and (3) How far can we pursue democratic ideals through limited, representative government without succumbing to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy? How far can an increasingly diverse, divergent, and demanding people push a restrained-but-popular process of governance toward fuzzy and contradictory democratic ideals without damaging that process or those ideals. In other words, how far can we carry our national democratic experiment without going too far? This simple question conveys t he noble quest and potential danger of America's historic spectacle. .............................. "AMERICAN DEMOCRACY": THE MAGICAL MIX OF PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND GOVERNMENT THROUGH WHICH WE PURSUE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. If, as I have proposed, America is a "national experiment in democratic ideals", then "American democracy" is the practical political process-a sort of civic laboratory-for translating our community of ideals into progressive public policy. More normatively, I use the term "American democracy" to refer to the magical mix of people, politics, and government through which our progressive experiment has worked effectively for the past two centuries. Each of these elements has provided critical contributions to the democratic process; and, collectively, they have represented extraordinary civic chemistry. For most of our history, that civic chemistry has encouraged democratic ideals, even when those ideals represented abstractions, uncertainties, and contradictions within our polity. Indeed, our people, politics, and government have fashioned a remarkable record in dealing with the sequential questions of our Great Experiment- "Can...", "How can...", and "How far can we pursue democratic ideals through limited, representative government without succumbing to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy?". American democracy is acknowledged universally for its seemingly endless and progressive realization of substantive democratic ideals. ........................... I should acknowledge at this point the difficulty of talking about America and American democracy as though there were a singular national democratic community or personality at play in this discussion. Too often, analysts attempt to explain our national history and politics with the implication that we speak in one voice with clearly identifiable meaning, when in fact there is a diversity of messages and messengers underlying our actions. For example, too much has been made of the national mood change in 1992 when Bill Clinton was elected president, ending the reign of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, or when the Republicans took over congress in 1994 after decades of Democratic dominance. The reality is that the American electorates of 1992 and 1994 were more similar than different from previous years; we were split into roughly equal camps, with only very small margins changing control of government. While it is possible to talk about very consequential differences in those "swing" elections, it is inaccurate to characterize them as expressions of a singular mindset or a total mood change. The unclear mandates of the 1996 and l998 elections more accurately reflect the multiplicity of our national community and its political personality. Equally central to my analysis is the fact that there is no formal, official American ideology or creed of democratic ideals. We hold self-evident truths, we ordain the Constitution, and we pledge allegiance; but we have never really defined or committed ourselves to any systematic set of concepts that could serve as a clear statement of what America means philosophically or politically. This historic indefiniteness is critical to understanding my definition of America as "a national experiment in democratic ideals" and my analysis of the challenges facing our country, I should admit too that, despite my sentiments, America, as I have defined it, has always been something of a myth. Our national experiment in democratic ideals has never worked very smoothly. Slavery, injustice, violence, even civil war-these are only a few of the many unpleasant elements of the American experience. The important bottom line, however, is that our progressive democratic experiment has been sufficiently real and powerful throughout our country's history to suffice as the defining and distinguishing character of America. The interesting thing, furthermore, is that Americans historically have subscribed to this positive notion of America regardless of whether that notion fit their own personal experiences and lives. The vast majority of Americans-including most women, minorities, the poor, and the powerless-have stood erect, placed their right hands across their hearts, and loyally pledged their allegiance with a closing litany of "with liberty and justice for all". This phenomenal allegiance was a positive aspect of their civic development and a great service to t he American experiment. Fortunately, furthermore, our experiment has transcended partisan politics. Democrats preach "fairness" (equality) and Republicans push "opportunity" (freedom), but what we're all talking about is small-d democratic ideals (interestingly, within a small-r republican framework). I have served with Presidents Bill Clinton (D) and George Bush (R) and Speakers Newt Gingrich (R) and Tom Foley (D), and I can attest to the partisanship of their American visions; but I also can attest to their support of the progressive democratic march. .............................. "DYING": AMERICAN DEMOCRACY NO LONGER WORKS THE WAY IT HAS IN THE PAST, AND WE SEEM TO BE TIRING OF THE GREAT EXPERIMENT ITSELF. The central idea of this manuscript (as stated in my introductory remarks) is a complex and disturbing question for Twenty-First Century America: "Can our nation-a people of growing cultural diversity, with increasingly divergent ideals, values , and governance principles, in an environment of constricted political blessings and benefits-continue to sustain our collective pursuit of freedom, equality, and justice within the traditional framework of limited, representative government?" To put this idea into more urgent terms, "How far can America pursue the Great Experiment without succumbing to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy?" My rhetorical contention, of course, is that America may be dying-that American democracy no longer works the way it used to work and that we seem to be tiring of the Great Experiment itself. It is not my contention that America has died. Nor are we comatose. We are very much alive. But America is evidencing regressive civic illness that, without treatment, jeopardizes the future of our national experiment in democratic ideals. I should repeat here that my "dying" inquiry is not tied to any specific issue or ideological interpretation of contemporary policy and politics. Today's ailment goes beyond day-to-day developments within the political arena, and it inflicts unhappiness and discomfort on liberals and conservatives alike. My objective is to go beyond current conditions in order to deal with more serious and consequential considerations. My concern about America's civic health is based on what I consider more basic, fundamental, structural developments-unhealthy systemic changes-in American democracy. .............................. Our Great Experiment is a tricky endeavor, and its course can never be easy or straight. It requires sustained national commitment-by a multiplicity of citizens, political subcultures, and geographical entities-to democratic ideals and the balancing of inevitable strains among those ideals, such as freedom-versus-equality, individualism-versus-security, and majority rule-versus-minority rights. Tricky too is the notion of controlled, popular governance, which has within it, not only the potential for what philosophers call the "good life", but also the democratic seeds of tyranny and anarchy and perhaps dissolution. Interminable conflict is built into a system which gives ultimate authority to the people (through their elected representatives) to resolve their conflicts by adopting undemocratic policies and practices. The people have within their ultimate authority ( through constitutional revision) the power to alter or even to terminate the Great Experiment itself. That ultimate authority-the vast power of a democracy to pursue unhealthy, undemocratic "ideals"-is what I mean in my warning about "the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy". Our constitutional founders hoped, of course, that America would-forevermore-pursue democratic ideals within a limited, representative framework. But they realized that, with the passage of time , Americans might divide into opposing camps-pitting democratic ideal (such as freedom) against democratic ideal (such as equality)-in a win-lose game to be determined by a weak, fragmented governmental apparatus. A cynicalized America-perhaps exhausted and divided in its pursuit of democratic ideals-might decide to expand (or constrain) our system of ideals and governance beyond (or to a lesser extent than) its intent. Future Americans might ask the American experiment to produce something that it is incapable of producing-perfect blessings and benefits-or we might inhibit the experiment from doing what it was designed to do-assisting, in a practical way, the pursuit of democratic ideals. Perhaps the greatest danger is that the American people might begin to view the Founders' experiment as no longer relevant to their lives-they could decide to walk away from our national system of ideals and governance. Either option (expansion or constriction or abandonment) could be carried democratically to the ultimate, self-destructive resolution of conflicting American visions These dangerous inclinations toward democratic excess, democratic incapacitation, and democratic irrelevancy, then, are the inherent, destructive potential of our Great Experiment. Thus our Founders structured an invitation to constant political assault on the delicate balance of the American system. They struggled vigorously with this fundamental dilemma; and it has challenged our political leaders and fascinated a worldwide audience ever since. Nevertheless, from the beginning, our American experiment has progressed toward the broad, general ideal of democracy. Now, after two centuries of the continuing dilemma, our delicate experiment is in trouble. ............................. We will conduct an empirical examination of our ailing American system in the next lecture ("Political Observations of Dysfunctioning America"), but for now I want to establish the logic of my "dying" terminology. Speaking in physiological terms, "dying" can be defined as the process of terminal systemic degeneration-the increasing inability of an organism to perform normal, essential, sustaining functions of life. Most healthy organisms experience spurts of growth, perform vital functions, and regenerate themselves periodically over the course of their lives. However, all organisms also represent an inevitably changing balance of growing, functioning, regenerating... and eventual degeneration. This balancing process can be altered, disrupted-and terminated-by unhealthy developments within the organism and/or its environment. Degeneration can take the form of specific, sudden, dramatic developments-such as a heart attack, a brain aneurysm, or drowning; however, more often than not, it represents the general onset of something like immune deficiency, metastatic cancer, or just old age. Quite often, furthermore, this degeneration is gradual, subtle, and not easily perceived. Regardless of the form or perceptibility, without organic adjustment (to accommodate changed environmental conditions) and/or environmental correction (to fit organic needs), the system will begin to experience increasing dysfunction and eventual shutdown. Therefore, systemic decline is a natural, inevitable pattern for any living organism; and there are historic parallels among nations, empires, and civilizations. In this manuscript, accordingly, I approach America's contemporary problem as progressive civic degeneration. The problem is not simply that yesterday America was healthy and today it is dying. It is not as though we have suffered dramatic public trauma. Nor is it a matter of a few, anecdotal, unconnected, unhealthy incidents. It would be irresponsible to invoke pathological terminology to refer to imagined discomforts, minor pains, routine ailments, or malfunctioning body parts. However, the term "dying" is appropriate if the suspect malady is of such widespread and critical nature as to jeopardize the survival of the American system. My thinking is that America is approaching or may have reached the point of systemic imbalance and fundamental civic illness. Our condition appears to be a serious totality of numerous democratic declinations . We are experiencing the cumulative effect of an unfavorable national environment, a philosophical civil war, a strained political culture, broken political machinery, and crippled government; and, consequently, we are beginning to experience civic fatigue. Our nation is evidencing clear symptoms of a syndrome that I will label, quite simply, "Un-American democracy"-an increasing , interrelated pattern of environmental, organic, and civic deterioration. And my concern is that America-as we have known it for two centuries-may be in jeopardy. In short, for purposes of my rhetorical inquiry, "dying" means systemic degeneration that threatens American democracy and the future of America. ............................... The bottom-line measure of our civic health, of course, is whether we can continue-now and for the long term-satisfactory progress toward democratic ideals such as freedom, equality, and justice. The key test is one of sufficiency. Is American democracy working sufficiently well-as it has in the past-to keep us, as a nation, committed to democratic ideals and the Great Experiment? Or, conversely, has American democracy changed-is it producing insufficient democratic progress? Have we tired of the experiment itself? Are we tending toward self-destructive sentiments and behavior? This discussion will continue in the next lecture-with clinical observations of dysfunctioning American democracy. Before leaving my theoretical proposition, however, I want to suggest a diagrammatic model of, hypothetically, "dying" America. .............................. A SYSTEMIC MODEL OF DYING AMERICA . A quick reference to a field of analysis known as systems theory will help clarify my "dying!" proposition; it also will provide the conceptual framework for the remainder of this manuscript. Systems theory has proven useful in explaining how systems (such as countries, organizations, and living organisms) work procedurally and substantively. Technically speaking, a system is a regularly interacting or interdependent group of elements forming a unified whole. Physiologically (the applicable perspective for my "dying" analysis), a system is a group of body organs that together perform a vital function. More pertinent to our discussion, systems theory, as presented by David Easton in A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965), helps us understand how nations succeed or fail in the face of significant challenges. According to Easton, a political regime's long-term survival is dependent upon proper functioning and interaction among the organic elements of that regime and upon a healthy relationship between that regime and the broader system within which it operates. Most importantly, there must be a positive relationship between systemic inputs (such as public opinion) and outputs (such as public policy). Another principle of systemic stability is the necessity of balance between two kinds of I nputs-demands (that place pressure on authorities and processes) and supports (that sustain the system). This latter category includes diffuse supports deriving from the belief that the systemic regime is the proper and legitimate way to make decisions for society and specific supports for particular authorities, processes, and policies. The trick for the system, and any democratic regime, is whether its political institutions and processes can translate a variety of positive and negative inputs into acceptable outputs within a generally unfocused, unruly, and changing systemic environment. This brief review of demand/support balance and the input/output relationship provides insight into why so many regimes worldwide are falling apart or have collapsed. More to the point, systems theory provides the basis for understanding what's happening in America. Systems analysis helps us sort out basic, causal factors (independent variables) from effect (dependent variables); it also helps identify factors that, while not basic, causal functions, are related and contribute to the problem (intervening variables). Such analysis further aids in recognizing factors that simply occur or appear to occur simultaneously (co-incidental or spurious variables). .............................. Take a look at my "Is America Dying?" model, which depicts pertinent elements, variables, and relationships of the American system-and America's failing civic health-through a comparison of historical and contemporary diagrams. ___________________________________________ (Place "Is America Dying?" model about here.) ___________________________________________ My systemic model is admittedly simplistic, since it is designed to emphasize the broad outlines of our predicament without the clutter of exacerbating or irrelevant problems. The value of this model is that it demonstrates graphically and concisely the theoretic foundation of my "Is America Dying?" inquiry; and it provides the conceptual framework for my clinical observations in the next chapter. The rationale of America's Great Experiment-and the basis of my model-is the idea that democratic ideals (even competing, contradictory ideals) can best be pursued by a diverse people through a loose framework of popular but restrained governance. Furthermore, that experiment works only under certain conditions. In other words, American democracy (our mix of people, politics, and government) was designed and has evolved within an environment of openness and opportunity-and without any stifling orthodoxy of unworkable ideals, values, and governance. Unhealthy changes in that supportive national environment obviously would create tremendous negative pressures on American democracy; and any changes among the organic elements (our people, politics, and government) of American democracy would further complicate our experiment . Eventually, these changes might begin to impact, negatively, our limited, representative system of governance-and our pursuit of democratic ideals. .............................. The historical diagram shows American democracy pursuing democratic ideals within a favorable national environment (shaped originally by open natural conditions and sustained by the popular expansion of public authority). This favorable national environment provides positive inputs (both demands and supports) to allow and encourage American democracy (a civic people, functional political machinery, and effective government) to magically mix and implement democratic ideals. These positive outputs then feed back into the national environment for systemic regeneration. The contemporary diagram shows struggling American democracy, especially American government , at the center of a troubled system. Our closed natural conditions and declining support for public authority have produced an unfavorable national environment for American democracy; furthermore, a philosophical civil war has entrapped, or "boxed", American democracy in a destructive fight over ideals, values, and governanc A cynical people and broken political machinery press ominously on beleaguered government, crippling day -to-day governance and more generalized aspects of American civic life. American democracy functions very poorly under such circumstances, and our national march toward democratic ideals slows to a contentious crawl. The resulting dysfunction then feeds back into the system as recycling negative environment. Over time, without correction, this pattern translates into systemic democratic degeneration. ............................. According to my model, the basic, causal factors in the systemic degeneration of America are the historic decline of our national environment and a contemporary philosophical civil war over democratic ideals, cultural values, and governance principles. These two inter-related factors are the primary independent variables straining American democracy, whose organic elements are experiencing significant changes and problems of their own. Together these developments are killing our Great Experiment. In this respect, my theoretic perspective differs markedly from conventional wisdom. Most commentators blame our government, politicians, and political institutions (and a few criticize the public) for America's civic problems. While I hold these participants accountable for their actions, I also see them all as struggling players in a "fixed" card game. In my analysis, the cards of the current game-an unfavorable national environment and a philosophical civil war-are stacked against our people, politics, and government. My model also differs from much of today's punditry in identifying what is not "the" problem-political scandals, declining morals, liberalism, conservatism, abortion, pornography, homosexuality, prayer in the schools, affirmative action, breakup of the family, crime, drugs, racism, incivility, talk radio, television, Hollywood, crooked politicians, campaign money, negative campaigning, the special interests, party politics, media scrutiny, the budget deficit, the national debt, or any of a variety of hot-button issues and villains . These issues and villains are important; some are corrosively controversial; some are simply objectionable nuisances, others only trivial diversion. Many of them derive, in part, from the fundamental dysfunctions of the American system; in turn, they infect our national environment with political toxins and seriously exacerbate our civic ills. Expectedly, our public debate and media tend to focus disproportionately on them. But they are, from an analytic perspective, merely coincidental or spurious elements of our unhealthy situation, problems that the American system is expected to address-and t hat we are dealing with-even under current duress. In summary, my model proposes that the basic, causal, fundamental problems of contemporary America are our declining national environment and philosophical civil war; and, together, these historic developments are stressing our people, politics, and government. The cumulative effect is systemic democratic degeneration. ............................. There's no way, under current conditions, that American democracy can continue to mix its magic for the long run. In the past, an indefinable "spirit of America" seemed to immunize us against threats to our national health-it got us through the depression, two world wars, and even a civil war. But today's threat is different and more pathogenic, challenging the continued functioning of limited, representative governance and our commitment to democratic ideals. Indeed, today's threat calls into question the future of America's Great Experiment! In body and soul, America may be dying! LECTURE # 3: "POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS OF DYSFUNCTIONING AMERICA." (Why and how is America dying?) "POLITICAL OBSERVATION NUMBER ONE: THE FAVORABLE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY HAS DISAPPEARED." In the preceding lecture, I laid the theoretic f oundation-systems analysis-for my "dying" proposition. In this chapter, I will begin presenting clinical observations (based on my own direct examination and assessments by others) about the "why" and "how" of dying America. I also plan to elaborate on some important and personally interesting developments-such as the technological revolution and the rise of electronic democracy-in contemporary America. My basic proposal, of course, is that America-our national democratic experiment-may be dying. We are not producing satisfactory democratic results, or even effective governance; and we seem, as a nation, to be tiring of the experiment itself. The essence of my analytic theory (presented in the previous chapter) is that the basic, causal forces driving the contemporary American system are our unfavorable national environment and philosophical civil war; and the result is degenerating American democracy-and, of course, our faltering Great Experiment. In a sense, I might speculate that America is dying because our national democratic experiment is stalled because American democracy no longer works because of a philosophical civil war because of a deteriorated national environment. Of course, it is impossible to prove empirically any cause-and-effect pattern or to sort out precisely our sickness from our symptoms. I simply will proceed on the premise (l) that our adverse national environment, philosophical civil war, and dysfunctional American democracy are interrelated ; and (2) that, collectively, they are hurting our national democratic experiment. Obviously, this inquiry is not a major research project; nor do I provide full documentation for the observations presented here. My objective is a normative, provocative thesis, supported by my own experience and expertise and supplemented by related scholarship and commentary. My expectation, of course, is that my proposed theory and clinical observations will help us understand the "why" and "how" of our contemporary predicament; and my hope is that this inquiry will encourage others to engage in further discussion and more scientific research so that we might chart our course to a healthier future. ............................ My thesis of American democracy begins with the truism that a political regime reflects, to a great extent, the environment within which it operates. More pertinent to our discussion, American democracy-as we have known it for most of our national history-has reflected the favorable conditions under which our country was founded and developed; and the erosion of those conditions in recent decades helps explain our systemic degeneration. AMERICA'S ORIGINAL, OPEN NATURAL ENVIRONMENT CLOSED LONG AGO. It is indisputable that American democracy was established and prospered in a setting of propitiousness unknown to any previous society. Their course was tough, but early Americans encountered a world of unlimited resources; most importantly, they had room to breathe, to grow, to experiment, to exercise freedom , individualism and independence. In brief, as visiting Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America (l835), the New World was a fairly open environment with economic, social, and political opportunity. These conditions provided a favorable setting for our people, politics, and government ; and they encouraged the collective civic chemistry for pursuing the progressive ideals of our national purpose. Tocqueville identified the practical attraction of this rich New World as the key motivation for early settlers and would-be Americans: "Thus the European leaves his cottage for the transatlantic shores, and the American, who is born on that very coast, plunges in his turn into the wilds of central America. This double emigration is incessant; it begins in the middle of Europe, it crosses the Atlantic Ocean, and it advances over the solitudes of the New World. Millions of men are marching at once towards the same horizon;, their language, their religion, their manners differ; their object is the same. Fortune has been promised to them somewhere in the West, and to the West they go to find it." (Vol. 1, p. 303) Tocqueville specifically cited these blessings as the foundation of democracy in America: "The chief circumstance which has favored the establishment and the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States is the nature of the territory that the Americans inhabit. Their ancestors gave them the love of equality and of freedom; but God himself gave them the means of remaining equal and free, by placing them upon a boundless continent. General prosperity is favorable to the stability of all governments, but more particularly of a democratic one, which depends upon the will of the majority, and especially upon the will of that portion of the community which is most exposed to want. When the people rule, they must be rendered happy or they will overturn the state; and misery stimulates them to those excesses to which ambition rouses kings. The physical causes, independent of the laws, which promote general prosperity are more numerous in America than they ever have been in any other country in the world, at any other period of history. In the United States not only is legislation democratic, but Nature herself favors the cause of the people." (Vol. I, p. 301) These advantageous circumstances produced American democrats who were optimistic as well as practical: "There is not a country in the world where man more confidently seizes the future, where he so proudly feels that his intelligence makes him master of the universe, that he can fashion it to his liking. It's an intellectual movement which can only be compared to that which led to the discovery of the new world three centuries ago; and one can really say that America has been discovered a second time." (Pierson p. 119) .............................. A half-century later, in a little noticed speech at the Chicago meeting of the American Historical Association, another unknown young scholar named Frederick Jackson Turner expanded this idea into, perhaps, the most significant essay in American historiography. In the opening paragraph of his speech, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893), Turner stated that "the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development." (P. I ) Turner's thesis (known as the frontier hypothesis of American history) emphasized the challenge as well as the riches of the New World: "The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people-to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economy and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life." (P.1) All nations undergo developmental experiences, Turner said, but in most cases this development has occurred in fixed environs with limited consequences or real growth for the polity. The case of the United States was different, with initial developments on the Atlantic coast recurring endlessly in a process of progressive evolution as Americans expanded westward. "Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development from that area." (P. I ) "This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character." (P. 2-3) In imagery reminiscent of Hollywood, Turner traced the transformational experience from Old World to New America. "The wilderness masters the colonist ... It strips off the garments of civilization ... Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion... Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the Old Europe... The fact is, that here is a new product that is American." (P. 4) American democracy derived not from some theorist's dream, Turner declared: "It came out of the American forest; and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier. Not the constitution, but free land and an abundance of natural resources open to a fit people, made the democratic type of society in America for three centuries while it occupied its empire." (P. 293) Both Tocqueville and Turner stressed that such an environment not only transformed people but also facilitated the development of an American brand of limited, representative democracy. To be specific, the openness and richness of the expanding frontier preoccupied America's people with their own endeavors, making government and politics relatively unimportant. Most Americans went about their lives without resorting to political institutions for help or redress of their grievances. As long as the frontier worked, people left government alone; and a select, elite leadership ran government with impunity as long a it did not antagonize the public egregiously. The result was a functioning partnership, within an environment of opportunity, among the people, their government, and the political machinery linking them together. Thus American democracy worked well. But how long could it last, Could it work well forever? .............................. Tocqueville may have revealed his own anxiety about the future of American democracy after a pioneer encounter in the frontier wilderness. He referred to the pioneer as "a representative of a race to which belongs the future of the new world" (Pierson p. 244); but he also added, without explanation, a strange comment on the inevitable problems which would accompany the exhaustion of the frontier: "It's this nomad people which the rivers and lakes do not stop, before which the forests fall and the prairies are covered with shade, and which , after having reached the Pacific Ocean, will reverse its steps to trouble and destroy the societies which it will have formed behind it." (P. The Frenchman perhaps realized that, eventually, western expansion must end, and therein would lie a basis of national discontent. Turner saw the beginnings of this discontent in his lifetime. In a 1914 commencement address at the University of Washington, he said: "To-day we are looking with a shock upon a changed world... We have so far won our national home, wrested from it its first rich treasures, and drawn to it the unfortunate of other lands, that we are already obliged to compare ourselves with settled states of the Old World ... The disappearance of the frontier, the closing of the era which was marked by the influence of the West as a form of society, brings with it new problems of social adjustment, new demands for considering our past ideals and our present needs." (Pp. 293-307) .............................. THE POPULAR EXPANSION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS. Many Americans shared Turner's concerns about the changing world. The declining natural environment and growing economic anxiety had already forced them to begin exploring new worlds in search of their dreams. A never-ending parade of potential "new frontiers" proceeded from the late nineteenth into the twentieth century-immigration, urbanization, industrialization, education, globalization, science, space, civil rights, and other transitional experiences. These developments are all reasonable explanations of enhanced opportunity and social progress; but none suffices as a universal theme or comprehensive explanation for what has happened in American history since the original frontier. Or, to put the point in question form, how do we account for the continued Great Experiment and enhanced democratic benefits throughout a discontinuum of mini-frontiers since the closing of America's open natural environment? I propose that a very apt and useful explanation is that America turned from a natural environment to a political environment, toward public authority, to protect and continue the benefits of its progressive experiment. Americans moved from declining geographic conditions to a propitious public forum. The depleted wilderness gave way to a governmental cornucopia of progressive development. My "political frontier" proposition lacks the drama, precision, and documentation that normally accompanies the announcement of another "new frontier" . But it does perform an essential basic service (in the way as does the frontier hypothesis) of explaining history in a way that helps us simplify the past, understand the present, and speculate about the future. The popular expansion of public authority has exerted a clear, comprehensive, and important impact on democracy in America for over a century, enabling us to deal with serious national challenges and to enhance our economic, social, and political opportunities in much the same way and to a comparable extent as did our original, open natural environment. Expanding public authority provided a nurturing and protective governmental environment for the continuing series of "new frontiers" that have shaped the American nation. In fact, we have discovered that public authority functioned, in some ways, better than could the wild frontier. Whereas New World conditions fostered freedom, individualism, and independence, the subsequent popular growth of public authority secured the more elusive blessings of equality, justice, and security for the people of our young nation. The government actually could create, distribute, and re-distribute values and benefits more progressively than did the state of nature. Thus we might say that we have experienced two timely "frontiers" central to our Great Experiment-the original existence of an open natural environment and the subsequent popular expansion of public authority. These natural and political frontiers-working together as a continuous, favorable national environment-began and sustained America's pursuit of democratic ideals throughout our national history. Now, however, we have to return to the nagging, critical question-"Can it last forever?" .............................. AMERICA'S HISTORIC DEMOCRATIC BOOM HAS BUSTED. Renowned historian Walter Prescott Webb raised the pertinent question at the midpoint of this century by articulating an "unpleasant logic" inherent in the frontier hypothesis of history: "If we grant the boom, we must concede that the institutions we have, such as democracy and capitalism, were boom-born; we must also admit that the individual, this cherished darling of modern history, attained his glory in an abnormal period when there was enough room to give him freedom and enough wealth to give him independence." ("The Frontier and the 400 Year Boom"). Webb believed that America was entering a political environment and period of history that would be far different from and less propitious for democratic progress than Turner's "open frontier" and Tocqueville's "boundless continent"; and he acknowledged serious personal concern about the future for American democracy after several centuries of democratic prosperity. "The future of the individual, of democracy and capitalism, and of many other modern institutions are deeply involved in this logic, and the lights are burning late in the capitals of the Western world where grave men are trying to determine what that future will be." (Pp. 94-95) My argument is that Webb's unpleasant mid-century logic has turned into an unpleasant end-of-century reality of constricted political blessings and benefits-a massive, disparate population crammed together in a limited environment, with little room to breath, facing stubborn challenges and finite resources. Gone is the free land, with its personal liberty and political opportunities . Apparently stalled, too, is the expanding governmental force that, with popular support, secured egalitarian benefits. The auspicious foundations that produced a practical people with civic virtue, that fashioned political mechanisms linking these people with their leaders, and that supported a sufficiently effective and efficient government, have faltered. The American people are becoming more cynical, we're junking our traditional political machinery, and we're overloading government with impossible demands. A mainpoint of my analysis, therefore, is that, as Webb might say, the boom has busted. Our favorable national environment has disappeared; and, partly as a result, broad, sweeping, unsettling developments are buffeting our country and American democracy. .......................... LECTURE # 4: "POLITICAL OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: WE HAVE ENTRAPPED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY WITHIN A PHILOSOPHICAL CIVIL WAR." The most unsettling development is that contemporary America has erupted into a divisive national debate about democratic ideals, cultural values, and principles of governance. We have plunged deep into a morass of serious and stubborn philosophical questions, some of which-like the role of religion and the power of central government-have dogged our nation since its birth and now threaten its future. In effect, we have entrapped American democracy (and our Great Experiment) within a philosophical civil war over ideals, values, and governance. The combination of this growing debate and our declining national environment presents a systemic crisis that is qualitatively different from anything experienced in this century. Exactly What Is the Philosophical Civil War? The philosophical civil war is a modern-day struggle to redefine the American experiment in terms of newly contentious democratic ideals, cultural values, and principles of governance. It can best be described as a civic brawl, an anarchic streetfight, a political free-for-all among disparate forces challenging the current course of American democracy. This is a systemic convulsion, an explosive reconsideration of what "democratic ideals" really means, mixed with destabilizing cultural values, along with the possibility of rearranged governance-all during, and perhaps reflecting, increasingly adverse environmental conditions for American democracy. The contemporary philosophical civil war defies easy definition because there are no clear ideologies, armies, or battlelines, and because there are too many contradictions and inconsistencies for traditional characterization. However, I will attempt to convey my view of the basic nature and crosscurrents of the war. The general mood of today's unsettling debate is one that supports democratic principles in general but questions, for a variety of rational and irrational reasons, the current course of American democracy . On one hand are hyper-champions of democratic ideals (particularly freedom) whose concept of democracy emphasizes majoritarian, traditional values. On the other hand are similar hyper-champions of democratic ideals (especially equality) whose concept of democracy emphasizes the values of an emerging, heterogeneous society. More often than not, the first camp favors a private-sector route to proper ideals and values (somewhat like the situation during our original, natural environment) and finds much to dislike about the contemporary democratic experiment; and the latter camp usually finds government (as in the historic expansion of public authority) in keeping with their views about ideals and values, views that fit more comfortably in recent development of the democratic experiment. Contributing to the anxiety of this situation is the fact that the majoritarian, traditionalist culture is in danger of losing its historically dominant status in an increasingly diverse America. Now I need to backtrack-and repeat my statement that this is a superficial conveyance that misses the variety and contentiousness of this debate. My emphasis on the majoritarian-heterogeneity clash ignores a growing libertarian movement that rejects both governmental and societal control-regardless of their philosophical orientation. These rabid democrats dislike governance and authoritarianism-period. They just want to be left alone, and they're fighting mad. My innocuous description actually understates the destructive impact of this war on the political process as we know it. Countless, uncooperative factions are running amok with particularistic ideals, values, and principles for improving America; and every faction employs strategies and tactics befitting its immediate needs of the moment. About the only commonalities among these disparate forces, beside their determination to reshape America, are their disrespect for civic moderation and their rejection of normal rules of the political game. .............................. It would be an incredible stretch to characterize today's civil war as a single, coordinated movement. However, the dominant substantive aspects of this war-democratic ideals, cultural values, and principles of government-are linked together in several important ways. In the first place, the three struggles are occurring simultaneously, a fact of more than casual significance; and there are some overlapping issues and constituencies. But, most importantly, they share kinship in that all three are disruptive of the prevailing direction and character of American history. After two centuries of democratic progress, values nationalization, and governmental centralization, these simultaneous, overlapping forces are now rebelling against an America they find increasingly unacceptable. In summary, the anarchic troops do not dress in similar uniforms, march in lockstep unison, or chant the same slogans; but collectively, they constitute a serious challenge to the continued course of American democracy. Today's convulsion may be more disruptive than rational, and the disparate warring factions may or may not represent the majority of Americans; but this philosophical civil war, in tandem with our declining national environment, is forcing us as a nation to deal with some hard, basic questions about "what America means" in terms of ideals, values, and governance. .............................. The average person, uninvolved directly but seriously impacted by this philosophical civil war, might reasonably ask why we are flagellating ourselves about "what America means" at this late date in our country's history. Surely, one might expect, these debates were settled in the beginning, when our country was founded. But the reality is that America's fundamental law, for all its strengths, is rather murky on these points. Our Constitution provides mixed and muted directions about democratic ideals, cultural values, and the structure and mechanics of governing. Our Founders created an amazing and enduring body of principles and practices; but, in some important respects, they packaged a very loose system based on a "bundle of compromises" and a "fill-in-the-blanks" foundation, leaving succeeding generations to deal with unresolved questions as they travel the course of history. Over time, America grew and changed substantially, and we moved along an uneven and uneasy path toward freedom and equality, nationalized values, and centralized governance. The most serious challenge to the prevailing direction of American development was settled militarily by the Civil War; and we continued along the bumpy road to where we are today. Now, those same basic questions (not about slavery, of course, but reflecting similar concerns about ideals, values, and governance) are back again. .............................. No one should be surprised that America is re-visiting its rather nebulous vision of democratic ideals. Contending concepts of democracy have been central to our Great Experiment, and those contentions have chronicled the entire history of t he United States. Disputes about freedom and equality and justice dominated the founding of our country and almost tore it apart in the mid-eighteenth century. What is surprising, I guess, is that it has taken us so long to aise the debate to its current frenzy. There is not much need to elaborate further at this point about this aspect of the philosophical civil war, since my general thesis and this entire manuscript are built around the unavoidable crisis of democratic ideals. It will suffice here to say that apparently we have reached the quantitative and qualitative boundaries of our national democratic experiment-too many people crowded into a constricted environment, thereby maximizing specific, competitive, and conflicting claims upon the broad, democratic ideal. The inevitable problem of democratic ideals thus has reached a stage of "ripeness" for national debate, a ripeness enhanced by emerging issues of cultural values and principles of governance. .............................. WE ARE EXPERIENCING A NATIONAL STRUGGLE OVER CULTURAL VALUES. The most divisive and potentially far-reaching political development in contemporary America is the struggle to determine America's cultural values. After two centuries of functional indefiniteness, we seem to be heading toward a national cultural showdown. "Bill Clinton-versus-the Republican Party" symbolizes to many the defining element of this culture clash. But the values movement is broader, deeper, and more consequential than politics. As James Davison Hunter explains in Culture Wars: The Struggle To Define America (1991): "...America is in the midst of a culture war that has and will continue to have reverberations not only within public policy but within the lives of ordinary Americans everywhere ... At stake is how we as Americans will order our lives together." (p. 34) According to Hunter, today's culture clash is rooted in different systems of moral vision and worldviews deriving from moral authority. The war pits cultural conservatives, or those inclined toward orthodoxy, against cultural liberals, defined as those inclined toward the spirit of the modern age. (Actually, he uses the term "progressives" but I prefer the more common "liberal" appellation.) The conservatives share a commitment to a consistent, unchangeable concept of what is good, who we are, and how we should live. They believe that moral authority comes from above and for all time. For the liberals, on the other hand, moral authority tends to be defined within the experience of contemporary society; and they view truth as a process that is forever unfolding. Even liberals of religious convictions can translate their historic faith according to the prevailing assumptions of modem life. Hunter is emphatic about the significance of this cultural struggle: "...the conflict is deeper than mere 'differences of opinion' and bigger than abortion, and in fact, bigger than the culmination of all the battles being waged. As suggested earlier, the culture war emerges over fundamentally different conceptions of moral authority, over different ideas and beliefs about truth, the good, obligation to one another, the nature of community, and so on." (p.49) Hunter traces the culture war across numerous fields of conflict-family, education, media, the arts, law, and electoral politics. He connects the dots among seemingly disparate disputes to a comprehensive struggle over national life itself: "...the contemporary culture is ultimately a struggle over national identity-over the meaning of America, who we have been in the past, who we are now, and perhaps most important, who we, as a nation, will aspire to become in the new millennium." (p. 50) .............................. Of course, we cannot leave this discussion of the cultural struggle without talking about the most confounding factor and flaw of American democratic history-race and racism. Just as slavery played a central role in our nineteenth century Civil War, racial factors figure prominently in today's cultural divide. Predictably, and philosophically, white Americans generally feel more comfortable with conservative orthodoxy while non-white Americans and other traditionally disadvantaged people quite often have a different vision of how we ought to define our country. These differing philosophical orientations lead to racially-charged fights over an endless list of political issues. Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall captured this volatility in Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (1991): "In a steady evolutionary process, race and taxes have come to intersect with an entire range of domestic issues, from welfare policy to civil service testing, from drug enforcement to housing regulation, from minority set-aside programs to the decline in urban manufacturing jobs, from prison construction to the globalization of economic competition, from college admissions standards to suburban zoning practices, from highway construction to Federal Communications Commission licensing procedures. In the struggle for government and private-sector resources, race has become a powerful wedge, breaking up what had been the majoritarian economic interests of the poor, working, and lower-middle classes in the traditional liberal coalition. Taxes, in turn, have been used to drive home the cost to whites of federal programs that redistribute social and economic benefits to blacks and to other minorities." (pp. 3-4) According to Edsall and Edsall, race and taxes, joined by a rights revolution (on behalf of, among others, criminal defendants, women, the poor, non-European ethnic minorities, students, homosexuals, prisoners, the handicapped, and the mentally ill) created a "chain reaction" realignment of the American electorate. Their conclusion reflects the same anxiety with which I undertook this discussion: "...at stake is the American experiment itself, endangered by a rising tide of political cynicism and alienation, and by basic uncertainties as to whether or not we are capable of transmitting a sense of inclusion and shared citizenship across an immense and diverse population-whether or not we can uphold our traditional commitment to the possibilities for justice and equality expressed in our founding documents and embedded in our most valued democratic institutions." (P. 288) .............................. ULTIMATE DEMOCRATIZATION IS THREATENING OUR TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF LIMITED, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNANCE. A less dramatic, relatively unfocused, but equally unsettling challenge of the philosophical civil war is the contemporary drive toward ultimate democracy. It is perhaps the foremost irony of our time that this historic democratization movement masks a direct threat to the established and long successful character of American government. This movement embodies our democratic experiment's inherent capability for undoing America's limited, representative framework of governance. .............................. The worldwide democracy explosion is usually described in glowing terms, as the triumph of western ideals over communism and authoritarian regimes. In America, we have fallen head-over-heels in love, again, with the idea that unlimited virtue, wisdom, and potential reside in the individual rather than society, government, or any established institution. We celebrate the independence and individualism of an evolving "Free Agent Nation" with its "Free Agent Declaration of Independence" ("Free Agent Nation" in Fast Company, Dec-Jan l998). John Q. Public is courted, quoted, pampered, and pandered as never before. "Man-in-the-street" comments are obligatory for all public issues. Town Hall meetings, public participation shows, public opinion polls, initiatives, referenda, faxes, e-mail, and the internet increasingly are the venues and staples of contemporary discourse. A frantic, almost religious worship of "the people" views democratization as the pre-destined solution to all our problems public and private; and the prevailing sentiment is that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy. America's particularized version of the democracy movement is a natural reaction to the historic growth of "Big Government", which over many years concentrated power and resources in Washington and weakened states and localities. This steady process of nationalization and centralization created a monstrous officialdom of federal employees, military personnel, and government contractors; it proliferated a public sector empire of social security, medicare, medicaid, farm subsidies, veterans benefits, student aid, unemployment, disability, and what is known simply as welfare. In addition to these financially-based activities, a large constituency has developed for an endless array of Big Government mandates extending the rights and blessings of national citizenship. Regardless of how federal operations are titled or defined, it is clear that America has been hooked on Big Government f or a long time. .............................. It is just as obvious that many Americans are ready to break the Big Government habit. Their challenge to Big Government is part of a universal movement of "anti-big" forces that have been changing our country and the world for at least two decades. John Naisbitt introduced us to these forces in his 1982 bestseller Megatrends: Ten Directions Transforming Our Lives. The opening sentence of his book communicates a grandiose effort to change America-as-we-know-it: "As a society, we have been moving from the old to the new. And we are still in motion. Caught between eras, we experience turbulence. Yet, amid the sometimes painful and uncertain present, the restructuring of America proceeds unrelentingly." (p. 1) Naisbitt's thought-provoking analysis, especially his interpretation of the road to and from Big Government, struck a responsive tone with many Americans: "for decades, institutions such as the government, the medical establishment, the corporation, and the school system were America's buffers against life's hard realities-the need for food, housing, health care, education-as well as its mysteries-birth, illness, death." (p. 131) "More and more, we relied on government to provide for basic needs. Government's traditional function is to safeguard citizens. We also asked that it provide food, shelter, and jobs." (p. 131) "but at various points during these last four decades, those institutions have failed us ... As we became more disillusioned we asked 'What, or whom can we trust?' The resounding answer was 'Ourselves.' " (p. 132) "During the 1970s, Americans began to disengage from the institutions that had disillusioned them and to relearn the ability to take action on their own." (p. 131) "By 1976, America's two-hundredth anniversary, we had turned the corner: The growing strength of the decentralization trend surpassed the receding tendency to centralize." (p. 161) .............................. Besides challenging the notion of a universal national interest, the "anti-big" movement represents an assault on the historic representational relationship between America's citizens and leaders (our constitutionally-guaranteed "republican form of government"). Consider Naisbitt's prescription regarding representative government: "Politically, we are currently in the process of a massive shift from a representative to a participatory democracy .... We created a representative system two hundred years ago when it was the practical way to organize a democracy ... For two hundred years , it worked quite well." "but along came the communication revolution and with it an extremely well-educated electorate. Today, with instantaneously shared information, we know as much about what's going on as our representatives and we know it just as quickly." "The fact is we have outlived the historical usefulness of representative democracy and we all sense intuitively that it is obsolete." (p. 160) .............................. Alan Rosenthal, a distinguished scholar of state legislatures, argues convincingly for the deliberative process of representative government designed by the Founders of our republic. In The Decline of Representative Government (l997), he reasons: "...the judgements rendered by a representative body, like those of the individual representative, derive in part from the give-and-take of discussion. More of a premium is on information, reason, commonality of interests, and even farsightedness than is the case in public judgements recorded by a poll or a referendum. Citizens are extraordinarily weak when it comes to deliberation. They are constrained by time, competing interests for whatever leisure hours they have, and the complexity that is usually involved ... And there is little recourse once a snap judgement is reached." (Pp. 40-41) Rosenthal acknowledges and laments the trend toward participatory democracy: "Government is no longer conducted with the consent of the governed, according to the original Federalist plan. It is conducted with significant participation by the governed, and by those who claim to speak for the public's interest, according to a more populist plan. The voices of elected representatives are being drowned out by pronouncements made on behalf of the public. Representative democracy, as the states had experienced it for several centuries, is now in decline." (Pp. 4-5) Today's leadership is wilting under assault by democracy's forces, according to Rosenthal. In a recent interview regarding state legislators, he said, "'I think they're getting too democratic in the sense that they're too tied, they're too responsive, too worried about public opinion polls, too insistent on pleasing rather than in doing what's right." (State Legislatures, pp. l4-15) The dangers of declining representative government are real, he warns, including enfeebled legislative leadership, unchecked executive power, unworkable public policy, and increased inequality (as organized special interests dominate and manipulate the political process). .............................. THIS PHILOSOPHICAL CIVIL WAR IS A DIFFERENT AND OMINOUS CHALLENGE. The nature of the philosophical civil war demonstrates that we are dealing with something that, in several respects, is very different and potentially ominous for American democracy. First is the moral totality of the struggle. The contemporary battle over democratic ideals, cultural values, and principles of governance is one of philosophical character and universal authority rather than a scramble for the traditional spoils of politics. Today's philoso-warriors conduct themselves as self-ordained Founding Fathers and Mothers of "New Millennium America", evangelical crusaders who often demonize the opposition and sometimes attack their own friends in their fight for absolute victory. Virtually every public official in today's political process has been burned, at some time or another, by the fires of this war. Second is the comprehensive substantive nature of the battlefield. Some of the struggle falls along an ideological continuum, but it is not simply a Democrat-Republican fight or even a liberal-conservative competition. The range of debate is astounding-government vs. the individual, religion vs. secularism, community vs. diversity, rights vs. responsibilities, nationalism vs. globalism-the list goes on and on. The battle contaminates the entire universe of issues. For example, some of the most contentious debates in Congress over national defense now involve, not weapons systems, but abortion and homosexuality. Third, the war is a spatial ubiquity waged in all forums and at all levels, from the power centers of Washington, to the textbook committee of the local school board, and even to the playing fields of neighborhood youth sports. The combatants have no respect for established boundaries and inter-relationships of traditional institutions of governance or for the distinction between public sector and private sector activities; they fight the good fight anywhere and everywhere. A fourth distinctive feature of this struggle is the sophistication of its warfare. The participants are intelligent and well resourced, and they have mastered the art, weaponry, and technology of politics. Traditional American politics is having t rouble dealing with the firepower of the warring factions. Fifth, the current struggle is being waged in an environment of corrosive cynicism without the ameliorative influence of traditional political machinery; in fact, today's political machinery quite often contributes to the negativity of our times. Finally, we must take seriously the potential long-term impact of today's philosophical civil war. Unlike other political movements or fights, this war, conducted within a declining national environment, could wreak permanent havoc on American democracy. To summarize, what is new and dangerous about today's philosophical conflict is its massive cumulation of moral totality, substantive scope, ubiquitous reach, sophisticated firepower, corrosive cynicism, and potential impact. This is an all-out survival struggle over fundamental ideals, values, and governance. Powerful forces on different sides of many divisive issues demand that whatever they want is a matter of moral imperative and public consequence which must be resolved, absolutely, now, with finality and authority, for everybody in America. Considering the anxieties and uncertainties of a changing society, this is a recipe for disaster, not only for American democracy but also for America. .............................. LECTURE # 5: "POLITICAL OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: "AMERICAN DEMOCRACY NO LONGER WORKS THE WAY IT HAS IN THE PAST." For some time, our declining national environment and philosophical civil war have been impacting negatively on American democracy. American democracy is not working the way it has in the past; and the critical elements of our magical mix-our people, politics, and government-individually and collectively are evidencing the degenerative effects of terminal civic illness. Our current suffering differs significantly from past practice. Historically, the elements of American democracy-our people, politics, and government-developed and functioned for a loosely-structured system of limited, representative governance within a favorable environment; and, in fact, our historic system worked pretty well. The American people were a functional civic mix-self-interested, privately-oriented, and publicly-disorganized, but generally supportive of democratic ideals. Interaction between these politically unsophisticated people and their leaders necessitated the development of linkage organs-election campaigns, political parties, and news media, all tending toward democratic participation. Relatively unconstrained institutions of governance functioned, efficiently and sufficiently enough, in pursuit of democratic policies and practices. Thus, democratic ideals such as individualism and equality thrived in a non-zero-sum game played loosely within a supportive environment of natural conditions and national authority. The magical mix worked its magic. Now, under changed circumstances, these elements of American democracy clearly are not functioning as they are supposed to or as they used to. This manuscript is not an American government and politics textbook, so I will not attempt a full presentation of the structure and workings of American democracy. I simply will characterize how our people, politics, and government are evidencing symptoms of systemic democratic degeneration. .............................. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE LOSING THEIR CIVIC SPIRIT. The most discomforting aspect of dying America is that the American people are losing their civic spirit. Our national personality increasingly is one of uncivic public character. I regret having to point my finger of blame at "we the people". It would be easier directing my attention toward popularized villains, such as politicians, politics, corruption, or the special interests as the dysfunctioning elements of American democracy. However, governmental and political reform will be meaningless and unattainable unless "we the people"-including both the public and our leaders-admit our unhealthy civic condition. For decades, cynical notions have been replacing traditional concepts such as trust, duty, and patriotism. The eroding rights and responsibilities of individual citizenship and leadership are taking with them the healthy benefits of participation within a broader civil society. Our cynicism has reached far beyond the political arena, infecting our relationships with virtually all institutions of society-our work, our schools, our churches, the news media, sports, anything that smacks of authority and power. .............................. The Importance of Civic Culture. It has long been recognized that the nature of a country's government and politics depends, in important ways, on the basic beliefs and practices of its people. Certain civic principles must be present among the general population in sufficient degree to sustain a stable democracy. In short, a healthy political culture provides a favorable foundation for American democracy. Although the ancient Greeks and successive philosophers deliberated extensively about civic virtue , systematic development and documentation of the I dea is a relatively recent endeavor. The behavioral approach to politics in this century opened a door to analysis which was unavailable to earlier thinkers and scholars. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba provided the most significant and definitive statement of this classic theme in The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963). Almond and Verba focused on "civic culture", a term which they differentiated from the more conventional idea of "civics". Civics refers to what we usually read in textbooks about how citizens ought to act in a democracy; civic culture defines a situation in which political facts-of-life temper the civics ideal and make it work in the real world. Their commentary is so instructive about the nature of the requisite mixture and balance that I want to quote extensively and selectively from their concluding chapter ("The Civic Culture and Democratic Stability"): "The civic culture, which sometimes contains apparently contradictory political attitudes, seems to be particularly appropriate for democratic political systems, for they, too, are mixtures of contradictions." "thus the democratic citizen is called on to pursue contradictory goals; he must be active, yet passive; Involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential ... As our survey showed, there exists a gap between the actual political behavior of our respondents, on the one hand, and their perceptions of their capabilities to act and their obligation to act, on the other ... The comparative infrequency of political participation, its relative lack of importance for the individual, and the objective weakness of the ordinary man allow governmental elites to act ... Yet the very fact that citizens hold to this myth-that they see themselves as influential and as obligated to take an active role-creates a potentiality of citizen influence and activity ... But if a mechanism such as the one we postulate is to work, the attitudes of elites must complement those of non-elites. The decision maker must believe in the democratic myth-that ordinary citizens ought to participate in politics and that they are in fact influential.""This balance between consensus and cleavage is managed within the civic culture by a mechanism similar to the one that managed the balance between activity and passivity; that is, an inconsistency between norms and behavior ... the civic culture allows a balance between apparently contradictory demands through the mixture of a set of norms ... and actual behavior ... that are themselves in contradiction one with the other.""in sum, the most striking characteristic of the civic culture as it has been described in this volume is its mixed quality ... There is political activity, but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is involvement and commitment, but they are moderated; there is political cleavage, but it is held in check.""the mixture of attitudes found in the civic culture, we have argued in this chapter, fits' the democratic political system. It is, in a number of ways, particularly appropriate for the mixed political system that is democracy." The Emergence of Uncivic Society. Almond and Verba's version of civic culture was a general description of America of the 1950s. Unfortunately, we have seen in the latter half of this century a drastic deterioration of civic character. In a l980 update of their pioneering study, The Civic Culture Revisited, one of their contributors reflected on changes in civic America: "Americans today are more cynical about politicians, less confident in their institutions, and more politically sophisticated than they were only a decade earlier." (p. 203). The years since then have seen further deterioration of America's civic spirit and increasing jeopardy for the American system. A high profile National Commission on Civic Renewal (headed by former Democratic Senator Sam Nunn and former Education Secretary William Bennett, a Republican) recently reported in "A Nation of Spectators" (June, l998) that America's civic life is in need of significant improvement: "Civic health may be measured along several dimensions-participation in electoral politics, political and social trust, voluntary sector activity, and attitudes and conduct bearing on the moral condition of society, to name a few... "Not all of these trends move in the same direction. Political participation and all forms of trust have declined significantly in the past generation, although there is some evidence of stabilization and perhaps even modesimprovement during the past two years. Crime statistics have improved especially in the early l980s and again in the past five years. The soaring rate of divorce stabilized in the early l980s and has trended slowly downward ever since. Out-of-wedlock births rose sharply for three decades before peaking in l99l and then declining modestly. (The number of women having abortions also declined-by l5 percent-between l990 and l995.) And statistics on associational memberships of various kinds present a mixed picture, with declines in many traditional organizations (such as gender-specific social clubs and unions) offset by gains in professional societies and faith-related small groups. "In short, there have been a number of promising developments over the past decade. But when most Americans evaluate our civic condition, their point of comparison is not the late l980s or early l990s, but rather their sense of how things were a generation ago. In this key respect, the Index of National Civic Health is consistent with the beliefs o f most Americans: ouroverall civic condition is weaker than it was-and in need of significant improvement." This declining civic spirit has important consequences for the future of American democracy. As Georgia Anne Geyer says in Americans No More: The Death of Citizenship (1996), "If allowed to persist, the phenomenon will surely destroy America as we have known it." Arguments can be made about the extent and causes, but it is clear that our basic civic culture is significantly more problematic than what was observed at mid-century. Our overall mixture of orientations and behavior has shifted in a decidedly uncivic direction. .............................. THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ARE MALFUNCTIONING. Historically, there has existed in America a complex system of political mechanisms linking our people with their government. These mechanisms, working together as vital organs of our national political body, have been critical to the success of American democracy. An Organic System of Elections, Parties, and Media. America's organic system of elections, parties, and media was not designed originally as a fully functioning part of American democracy; it evolved, over time, from necessity. Some of these mechanisms developed integrally as formal interactions between the public and government (such as the electoral system); some developed consequentially (such as political parties); others simply coincided (such as the news media). But, collectively, they constituted an organically functioning support system for American democracy and our national experiment in democratic ideals. Normally, these political organs work to transmit public opinion to public officials (upward linkage) and, conversely, to relay the sentiments of those officials to their constituents (downward linkage). In the course of this mediating service, these institutions perform the equally valuable function of moderating some very contentious, divisive, and sometimes unhealthy ideas. The organic machinery of American politics has worked in almost miraculous ways to translate public opinion into public policy (and just as importantly, to shape public opinion on behalf of national policy goals). Sometimes unintentionally, inefficiently, and ironically, this complex system has made American government sufficiently responsive to the diverse interests of its citizens while at the same time allowing the government to exercise responsibility for the broad public interest. In simpler times, these vital political organs worked reasonably well. America needed intermediary mechanisms because direct democracy was inappropriate and impractical. Within a favorable and democratic environment, they served to link a relatively unsophisticated, uninterested, and disorganized people with their relatively unstructured government. Our system of elections, parties, and media worked well for our limited, representative system of governance. Now, of course, this organic system of American politics I s not working very well. The declined national environment, a philosophical civil war, and an uncivic populace have radically impacted such critically essential institutions as the news media, political parties, and elections. These developments have been documented elsewhere; what I want to focus on is the increasing importance of modern technology on the future of our Great Experiment. The Rise of "Electronic Democracy". It is important to understand that the technological dynamics of modern life are contributing to the organic obsolescence of our elections, parties, and media. The American people and their government are being "wired" together by a technological revolution that is changing our national linkage mechanisms and the very nature of American democracy. The technological wiring of American democracy is rampant and important-computerized data banks and research capabilities, personal computers, home computers, laptops, phone banks, cell phones, teleconferencing, direct mail-tv-radio, faxes, e-mails, beepers, the internet, world wide web, C-SPAN, CNN, and other constantly evolving technological progress. These technological developments are changing all forms of political transaction-research analysis, advocacy, lobbying, fundraising, endorsements, advertising, campaigning, constituent relations-and virtually every aspect of the relationship between the people and their government. Upward and downward linkage in electronic democracy is more diverse, direct, personal, immediate, continuous, voluminous, and substantive-and increasingly unfettered by mediating bureaucracies of the past. Without question, traditional linkage mechanisms such as elections, parties, and media are becoming less relevant. Quickly and surely, America's traditional political process is transitioning into "electronic democracy". .............................. Jon Katz declared the reality of this technological revolution and suggested its significance for American democracy in "Birth of a Digital Nation" (Wired Magazine, April, 1997). Katz concluded, after assessing the role of the Web on the 1996 elections, that the real story at the end of the twentieth century is the beginning of a postpolitical world: "I saw the primordial stirrings of a new kind of nation-the Digital Nation-and the formation of a new postpolitical philosophy. This nascent ideology, fuzzy and difficult to define, suggests a blend of some of the best values rescued from the tired old dogmas-the humanism of liberalism, the economic opportunity of conservatism, plus a strong sense of personal responsibility and a passion for freedom." "There are paradigm-shifting changes afoot: the young people who form the heart of the digital world are creating a new political ideology. The machinery of the Internet is being wielded to create an environment in which the Digital Nation can become a political entity in its own right." The people of Digital Nation are not representative of the American population, Katz admits; they are richer, more educated, disproportionately white, predominantly male, inhabitants of wired institutions and industries such as universities, computer and telecom companies, financial outfits, and the media. As a result, he says, the ideas of the postpolitical young, unlike America's rigid historic ideologies, are fluid; but some of their common values are clear-"they tend to be libertarian, materialistic, tolerant, rational, technologically adept, disconnected from conventional political organizations". And they are politically restless: "They are not afraid to challenge authority. They take no one's word for anything. They embrace interactivity-the right to shape and participate in their media ... The digital young, from Silicon Valley entrepreneurs to college students, have a nearly universal contempt for government's ability to work; they think it's wasteful and clueless. On the Net, government is rarely seen as an instrument of positive change or social good. Politicians are assumed to be manipulative or ill-informed, unable to affect reform or find solutions, forced to lie to survive. The Digital Nation's disconnection from the conventional political process-and from the traditional media that mirror it-is profound." The potential of this growing sub-nationalism is powerful: "Here is a growing elite in control of the most powerful communications infrastructure ever assembled. The people rushing toward the millennium with their fingers on the keyboards of the Information Age could become one of the most powerful political forces in history. Technology is power. Education is power. Communication is power. The digital young have all three. No other social group is as poised to dominate culture and politics in the 21st century." "If they choose to form a political movement, they could someday run the world. If they choose to develop a common value system, with a moral ideology and a humane agenda, they might even do the world some good." .............................. What Does This Technological Revolution Mean For American Politics? The rise of "Digital Nation" may indeed represent, as Katz proclaims, the beginning of a great revolution, a postpolitical ideology, the rebirth of love for liberty, a more civil society, a new politics based on rationalism, shared information, the pursuit of truth, and new kinds of community. In a sense, we may be creating, through this technological revolution, a vastly different kind of American politics. Perhaps we now have available to us technology that can serve the needs of our national republic better than can old-fashioned political operatives and outdated campaign, party, and media mechanisms. In the future, liberty, equality, and all the other benefits of democracy may be pursued under changed institutional conditions. For example, our technological revolution may lead us to a different magical mix of people and their government, a mix devoid of intermediating political machinery. Or, maybe, it will lead us to reject both traditional political machinery and republican governmental arrangements in favor of direct, democratic self-government. And who knows where this could lead in terms of new ideals, values and governance? In effect, we may be experiencing an "electronic new frontier". Perhaps we have entered a technological version of our original natural environment, an open, adventurous environment that will radically alter opportunity and society and government. Perhaps, like the expansion of public authority, this newest frontier may enable us to revisit and perfect the institutional arrangements designed during earlier periods. Perhaps modern-day electronic pioneers are embarking upon a totally new, exciting, and different America. But this technological revolution also evokes anxiety about the central question of our Great Experiment: "How far can we pursue democratic ideals through limited, representative government without succumbing to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy?" Regardless of the nobility of its sentiments, Digital Nation envisions a political system far different-socially, economically, politically-from the origins of our democratic experiment and what we now know as American democracy. Electronic democracy rejects traditional electoral/ partisan/media linkages and challenges the very concept of representative governance; and it could push our historic fuzziness about freedom-vs-equality toward an ultimate, unhealthy resolution of total freedom over equality, or something worse. The technological revolution may, unfortunately, be moving us perilously closer to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy. ............................... A Broken Political System. Perhaps I over-estimate the import of the technological revolution. As I have noted, there are those who hail electronic democracy as the rebirth of civil society. However, there is virtually universal agreement that our contemporary political machinery is malfunctioning. The historic functional relationships among the media, parties, and elections have deteriorated; and the representational linkages between our people and our government have weakened: The news media have lost their dominant role in mediating and moderating public debate. The people and public officials have figured out how to bypass the traditional press. What's left today is very little news and even less public dialogue. Political parties have fallen into disrepair and disrepute. The parties do a poor job of pulling voters and candidates together or linking the people with their government; instead they serve mainly as conduits of special interest money and influence. Elections too often have become empty and demeaning experiences. Campaigns and elections are held, but public participation and support are declining. Money and nastiness dominate as never before. Voters and candidates are disgusted with each other and the system. In short, the American system of politics is broken. The forces of changing America are undermining the health of our elections, parties, and media; and our malfunctioning political machinery is creating serious problems for American government. .............................. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS HEADED TOWARD STROKE, PARALYSIS, OR SOMETHING WORSE. The clearest example and most maligned element of failing American democracy is government. We are overloading and crippling America's governance system with increasing, contradictory, impossible demands and decreasing supports. American government is headed toward stroke, paralysis, or something worse. The easy and accurate explanation is that we have dumped all the burdens of degenerating American democracy on the formal institutions of government. The fact is that broad, systemic changes-especially the deteriorated national environment and our philosophical civil war-are re-shaping America. These systemic developments, combined with unhealthy civic developments among our people and politics, are crippling American government and eventually will force its re-invention. .............................. There can be little argument that the condition of American government has changed significantly during the latter half of the twentieth century. Our touted model of modern democracy-known among academicians and journalists as "democratic pluralism"-has run seriously off-course. Of course, this notion-that our people's common interest is best served through a vigorous balancing of interest group politics-has been undergoing revision for quite awhile since its analytic heydays of the l950s and l960s. The fact is that American governance simply does not measure up to the standards of pluralist theory. Many of us are tempted to blame our troubles on easy scapegoats--"politicians". To be sure, there is much in the news and scholarly research to support this elitist interpretation of America's contemporary democratic dysfunction. In their new Millennial Edition of The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics (l999), Thomas R. Dye and Harmon Ziegler offer biting commentary on whether the government is "run for the benefit of all the people" or "by a few big interests looking out for themselves": "Thirty years ago, when The Irony of Democracy was first written, a majority of Americans believed that their government was being run for the benefit of all; the elitist view was expressed by relatively few people. Today an astounding 80 percent of Americans believe that their government is run 'by a few big interests looking out for themselves. ' The elitist perspective, which we developed as an analytic model of American politics, has now become part of the popular political culture!" (P. xiii) Dye and Zeigler, original l960s proponents of an almost conspiratorial assessment of America's political system, now view our governmental apparatus and leaders with even greater jaundice: "This Millennial Edition of The Irony of Democracy... reflects, first of all, our increasing distress over current elite distemper-corporate greed, media arrogance, interest group gluttony, big money political influence, and, above all, the self-serving and shortsighted behavior of today's governmental leaders." (P. xiv) "It is not only the sordid tale of 'Presidential Sex, Lies, and Impeachment' on which we base our critical assessment, or even the 'Ambition and Ambivalence' of the Clinton presidency. It is also the sanctimonious, self-serving, and arrogant behavior of members of Congress, federal bureaucrats, and federal judges." (P. xv) Their predictive assessment is almost as apocalyptic as my dying proclamation: "...over the years we have become convinced that the principal threat to democracy in the United States today arises from irresponsible elites seeking relative advantage at the expense of shared societal values." (P. xiv) A less jaundiced but equally alarming analysis is provided by Robert Dahl, the foremost advocate of our mid-century theory of democratic pluralism. In The New American Political (Dis)Order (l994), Dahl says that American politics has changed so much since the l950s that it is now a new order. In the first place, political power is so fragmented as to make the system almost inoperable; secondly, there now is unprecedented direct communication between the represented and their representatives. The result is that American pluralism is becoming incapable of deliberative, coherent, and effective government. Or as another prominent democratic theorist calls it, "hyperpluralism"--meaning too many special interest groups chasing too few benefits, ignoring the common interest, and eventually choking the governmental system. "I think that we have reached a threshhold of so much competition among the groups for scarce resources that we've reached a level of deadlock and crisis," says James Thurber. (Rauch, p. 61) Jonathan Rauch characterizes the problems of contemporary American government at a more critical stage of ill-health, a condition he refers to as "demosclerosis", or "government's progressive loss of the ability to adapt". The problem is that we tend to form more and more groups demanding more and more benefits and then selfishly defend them to the detriment of our nation. As a result, he explains In Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government (1994), our government has lost its ability to make things work and solve problems effectively: "By definition, government's power to solve problems comes from its ability to reassign resources, whether by taxing, spending, regulating, or simply passing laws. But that very ability energizes countless investors and entrepreneurs and ordinary Americans to go digging for gold by lobbying government. In time, a whole industry-large sophisticated, professionalized, and to a considerable extent selfserving-emerges and then assumes a life of its own. This industry is a drain on the productive economy, and there appears to be no natural limit to its growth. As it grows, the steady accumulation of subsidies and benefits, each defended in perpetuity by a professional interest group, calcifies government. Government loses its capacity to experiment and so becomes more and more prone to failure." (P. 17) Rauch asserts that the culprit of demosclerosis is us ("It is a crisis of American appetites"); and our sickness is a gradual, progressive disease ("like hardening of the arteries") that gets worse if it is ignored ("it can be stopped only by a long-term change in behavior: a disciplined regimen of self-reform.") .............................. My "dying" proposition goes beyond "elite distemper", "hyperpluralism", and "demosclerosis". The great threat to American government is bigger than bad leaders, bigger than interest group politics, bigger than our appetite for public goodies, bigger than our inability to reassign resources. Problems of normal political deadlock can be overcome within the current operating framework of American government by skillful leadership and improved socioeconomic conditions-and it appears that we may be benefitting from such good fortune. Our current impasse, however, is a debility of much greater consequence and danger than conventional political wrangling. Our greater predicament is a combination of declined national environment, philosophical turmoil, weakened civic culture, broken political machinery-AND--distempered, hypered, and demosclerosed pluralism. And the result is crippled American governance. Considering what's happening throughout our system, we should not be surprised that American government is struggling to continue its normal, historic course. Without correction, American government is headed toward stroke, paralysis, or perhaps, theoretically, systemic shutdown. Consequently, the American people are beginning to question their commitment to the future of American democracy. .............................. LECTURE # 6: "POLITICAL OBSERVATION NUMBER FOUR: "AMERICA SEEMS TO BE TIRING OF THE GREAT EXPERIMENT." My final clinical observation reflects the cumulative impact of a deteriorated national environment, our philosophical civil war, and malfunctioning American democracy. An uncivic infection runs throughout our system; and the most depressing result is that America seems to be tiring of the Great Experiment itself. .............................. It is tempting to cite our current "presidential crisis" (and the public's accompanying angst) as the illustrative case of dysfunctional, dispirited America. Bill Clinton stands at the center of a cultural war that is straining and redefining basic aspects of our democratic experiment. Strangely, the President from Hope has generated unprecedented tension and discord; and there has developed around him an entire industry of destructive public discourse. The bitterness of our cultural conflict has seriously corroded historic relationships among the White House, the Congress, the Judiciary, our political parties, and the American people. More importantly, our civic leaders, the media, and the general population have discovered unacceptable incongruities between their preferred political notions and our historic fundamental framework of governance. It has been a debilitative national experience, and America has suffered dearly in the process. I also could focus on disturbing accounts of violence and killings in the schools of normal sounding places like Paducah, Edinboro, Jonesboro, Springfield, and Littleton as evidence of our civic depression. At Littleton, Colorado, for example, a couple of bright, shy, misfit teenagers apparently hated blacks, hispanics, religious people, jocks, and who knows what else. So they killed twelve classmates, a teacher, and themselves. Across the land there was grief-and the horror of something terribly wrong in America. In a floral shop thousands of miles away, a woman lamented that "You think we'd get hardened to this, but we don't...The things we assumed are evidently no longer true." In Washington, an angry parent of a seven-year-old exclaimed "I am so sick of this world being so screwed up!" (Washington Post, April 22, l999) However, I will bypass diatribes about the presidential crisis and the school shootings because there are other, less emotionally-charged, and more convincing indicators of troubled American democracy. Throughout our country-in big cities and rural areas, in centers of money and influence and obscure, rundown neighborhoods, among powerful leaders and powerless nobodies, on major public policies and inconsequential private issues-seemingly unrelated developments demonstrate decreasing commitment to our national experiment in democratic ideals. .............................. INCREASINGLY AND INCREMENTALLY, WE ARE RETREATING FROM OUR NATIONAL EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. Upon close examination, it appears that-increasingly and incrementally-we are retreating from our national experiment in democratic ideals. Almost without realizing it, contemporary America is changing and challenging the very nature of our experiment. Ironically, our civic laboratory is producing a variety of evolutionary, devolutionary, dissolutionary, and revolutionary movements away from historic American democracy. .............................. Let's deal first with the far-fetched but revolutionary challenge-the rash of violent civil eruptions that have jolted the American system during the l990s. Virtually everyone has heard of Oklahoma City, the worst terrorist attack ever on U.S. soil. An anti-government American citizen loaded common fertilizer and fuel oil unto a commercial rental truck and destroyed the nine-story Murrah Federal Building, killing l69 persons (including children attending a daycare center in the building). "It's the 'why' question. Why did they do that to me? Why did they do that to our country?" asked one of the survivors. President Clinton attempted an answer with ominous reference to "forces that threaten our common peace, our freedom, and our way of life." And the accused terrorist's defense attorney hinted at deep, dark, cultural troubles- "If we close our eyes to the social and political reality in which this crime occurred, we are fools." (CNN; December 30, l995) There also was Waco, with 75 people dead (including 25 children) in a fight between the government and a religious sect. And Ruby Ridge, where the government shot and killed the wife and son of a right-to-bear-arms advocate...and the continuing militia movement...and increasing incidences of attempted and suspected chemical-biological terrorism...and sporadic abortion attacks...and hate crimes...and anti-social venom flourishing publicly on the internet...and on and on and on. There's no real threat of revolution in the United States. But these civil outbursts and disruptions prove, dramatically and tragically, the presence of festering infections here in our own domestic body. They are like canker sores-ugly and painful and symptomatic of underlying conditions that bedevil our Great Experiment as we close the Twentieth Century. .............................. More appropriate, at least symbolically, for my "dying" thesis is the following one-paragraph item buried in USA Today (July 29, l997): SOUTH CAROLINA Greenville -- The Greenville County Library no longer has a community events bulletin board. Director Phil Ritter ordered it removed, saying his staff was caught in the middle of sniping from both sides of the political spectrum about what was on it. The Greenville County community bulletin board is rich as Tocquevillian metaphor for civil America. Substantively and procedurally, it represents the essence of grassroots democracy-a voluntary forum open to anyone in the library community to post announcements and information of public interest. The unseemly demise of that bulletin board sends a more pernicious message than presidential crisis, school shootings, and domestic terrorism about the state of our civic health. The library's action is a disturbing declaration by ordinary citizens that they cannot make the Great Experiment work anymore, that their democratic ideals and principles are not strong enough to sustain a community bulletin board in a public building. Sadly, such incidents of democratic dissolution are occurring increasingly in libraries and schools and communities throughout the country .............................. A more direct and unmistakable demonstration of what's happening in America-evolutionary alteration of the historic spirit and institutions of representative governance-is California's plebiscitary experience. California's penchant for initiatives (popularly proposed and approved policy) has begun to reshape, democratically, the nature of that state's great experiment. As former newspaper editorialist Peter Schrag notes in Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future (l998), the people of California, through popular initiatives, have radically altered their governmental machinery; and the result is significant disinvestment in public services and other civic endeavors: "California has not just seen a sharp decline in the quality of public services-education, public parks, highways, water projects-that were once regarded as models for the nation. It has also seen the evolution of an increasingly unmanageable and incomprehensible structure of state and local government that exacerbates the same public disaffection and alienation that have brought it on, thus creating a vicious cycle of reform and frustration." (p. ?) Schrag maintains, furthermore, that government by non-deliberative plebiscite reinforces majoritarian indifference, if not hostility, toward minority rights: "To say all that, probably, is merely to say awkwardly, what the Framers of the Constitution said better in Philadelphia, what Hamilton, Madison, and Jay said in The Federalist, and what scores of delegates said in l787-l788 at the various state conventions leading up to ratification, even before the Terror of the French Revolution: unchecked majorities are a danger to liberty almost as great as oligarchs and absolute monarchs. " (The Atlantic Monthly, March, l993, p. 30) David Broder recognizes an additional, unfortunate byproduct of declining representation in California's governance by plebiscite ("Californocracy in Action", The Washington Post; August l3, l997). Broder notes that many of these direct democracy actions have ended up in court, with unelected judges settling more and more questions of public policy. "On the sidelines in this whole process," he wrote, "are the elected representatives of the people-the very folks we thought of, in our naive days as a nation, as the proper repository of governmental power." Broder observes that this tension between the essentially unlimited power of a majority and the virtually unchecked power of judges could be avoided "if California ever learns to respect the wisdom of the Founders that a republic-with legislative power vested in elected representatives-is preferable to any other form of government." .............................. Oklahoma City, Greenville County, and California represent intriguing and important developments. However, the perilous state of America's civic health is demonstrated most significantly and convincingly in our national retreat from the Great Experiment. The President's l996 State of the Union Message ("The era of Big Government is over!") represents more than the electoral outcome of a partisan or ideological campaign. It signals to the world the devolution of authority and responsibility that have been so important, historically, to our national democratic experiment. To a certain extent, the President's announcement echoes, at the federal level, a message of frustration and resignation about the progressive march of American history-in effect, "We the people...give up!" Witness, for example, our national reluctance, despite a booming economy and international security, to tackle head-on-through full public power and institutions-a persistent plague of social ailments-such as racism, drugs, crime, and violence. Fortunately, an improved economy is mitigating these ailments, because "Big Ideas" are out, and little things-such as staged town meetings about race, photo opportunities about school uniforms, symbolic restrictions on firearms availability-are in. There are no serious federal initiatives or proposals, from either the White House or Congress, comparable to Social Security, the New Deal, or the Great Society. The federal judiciary, unlike progressive activists of yesteryear, seems content to tinker and tweak. Nor does there appear to be sufficient interest outside government for anything resembling the civil rights movement of the l960s. Even internationally, with no economic or military or ideological competitor in sight, we seem to have lost our way. There is no coherent Clinton Doctrine; and many Members of Congress seem proud of the fact that they have no passports. Despite a slew of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and combat actions, our international policy too often resembles a "9ll" service. Apparently out of the question is any grand new effort-such as the Marshall Plan or the Peace Corps-for meeting our international obligations and promoting the global pursuit of democratic ideals. .............................. John D. Donahue, who has studied extensively what he calls "America's endless argument" over the proper role of the federal government, recounts the contemporary decline of Washington in Disunited States: (1997); "As advocates of state primacy found their voice, the nationalist side of the argument was strangely muted. Washington acquiesced in the ascendancy of the states, and not only because of Republican dominance of both Congress and the statehouses. President Clinton, from what precise mix of conviction and stratagem it is difficult to say, proved broadly agreeable to letting Washington cede leadership to the states...The administration proudly noted, in a report on labor-market trends, that federal government employment had fallen by over one-tenth on its watch (from January l993 to March l996) while state and local government employment had grown." (P. 34) As Donahue notes, this shift was most dramatically demonstrated in its budget actions. "Federal domestic spending (aside from transfers and interest) fell from around 3 percent of the economy at the start of the l990s to less than 2 percent in l996. And under the administration's budget plans, federal domestic spending will continue its decline." (P. 34) Donahue predicts that Big Government will shrink further: "Aside from sending checks to health-care providers, Social Security claimants, and debt holders, the federal government will be a shrinking presence in most Americans' lives well into the early years of the twenty-first century." (P. 37) Many applaud these trends. For example, Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (Texas) declares that "states can be more efficient and more responsible if Washington just gets out of the way." (P. 33) But Donahue is concerned about the impact of centrifugal forces realigning our nation; "...if we want to have a free choice over the big questions of government's scale and purpose ... we must choose together, as a nation. Fifty separate choices sum to no choice at all," (P, 169) Donohue feels duty bound to make the case for "grown-up politics " against "the "false path to reform": "If we neglect the institutional foundations of national solidarity, the strains on our culture will become all the harder to contain. And the United States' willing disintegration, in the face of an integrating world, will be recorded as one of history's monumental follies." (P. 169) .............................. The reality is that there is no strong national consensus for continuing the current level and scope of the Great Experiment here and abroad. Downsizing the federal government's size and reach seems to be the order of the day at the White House, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. It is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain working majorities for existing, long-standing, national policies and programs of fairness and opportunity-such as Head Start, bilingual education, affirmative action, and international aid. Indeed, the major course of government today is running in the opposite direction-turning over to the states or the private sector what used to be federal responsibilities. Even essential functions-such as Social Security, national defense, and public welfare-are undergoing scrutiny for some devolution or privatization. Taken collectively, these and countless similar developments indicate that, in both substantive ideals and the political process, we are altering, significantly, the nature and operation of American democracy. .............................. DEMOGRAPHIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND INTERNATIOAL TRENDS ARE EXACERBATING OUR CIVIC DECLINE. I am struck furthermore by the civic ramifications of some less obvious but increasingly important trends during the past few years. Demographics, technology, and global economics are pushing public withdrawal from our collective democratic experiment. Social scientists of the l990s have documented pretty convincingly that Americans seem to be segregating themselves, along several dimensions, not just in terms of race, wealth, and status; and the gap between "us" and "them", by many measurements, is becoming more prominent and consequential for our collective democratic endeavor. For example, William Frey, a demographer with the University of Michigan's Population Studies Center, has identified and documented a "new demographic divide" that is sharply different from what has happened for most of the twentieth century. Frey says that America is dividing into "multiple melting pots" (states such as California, Texas, Florida, and New York with high numbers of new racial and ethnic minorities) and much of the rest of the country that is older, whiter, and more middle class. This phenomenon has important consequences for the future of America as a national experiment in democratic ideals. On the one hand, according to Frey, these emerging "multiple melting pots" will produce a different kind of "Americanization" for new immigrants in the twenty-first century (as contrasted with the assimilation process of the current century). But just as important is what Frey sees happening in the rest of the country: "New region-based political constituencies will emerge that place greater emphasis on middle class tax breaks and the solvency of the Social Security system, and that cast a wary eye on too much federal government regulation. Already these regions are becoming more conservative and more likely to vote Republican. Their residents will become far less energized over issues such as preserving affirmative action laws, extending the federal safety net to new foreign-born generations or maintaining bilingual education in the schools." ("New Demographic Divide in the US", p. 35) Such pronounced demographic division certainly bodes ill for the national democratic experiment. I have similar concerns about the aggravating effect of the contemporary technological revolution (and its accompanying information age) on our collective pursuit of democratic ideals. The technological revolution opens a world of opportunity and benefits to all of us; but it is disproportionately tilted in favor of those who already sit atop America's opportunity ladder (and those interested in downsizing our national democratic experiment). A recent Commerce Department report, for example, reveals a widening "digital divide" between the "haves" and the "have-nots". The national survey showed that whites are more than twice as likely to own a home computer as blacks or Hispanics. "It's shocking that these groups are being left behind", said Donna Hoffman, a Vanderbilt University expert whose research confirms these patterns. However, President Clinton's top telecommunications adviser says that "The political, cultural and economic gaps in our society are only going to get exacerbated... we've got a problem as a nation." These demographic and technological developments bother me, too, in light of the globalization of America. Without being jingoistic, I am concerned that we're divorcing ourselves-in the process of economic internationalism-from the American experiment. It's no ethical violation for America's corporate leaders to segregate their social and business lives from average people and to look abroad for bottom-line profits; nor is it a crime for America's consumers to ignore "Buy American" campaigns in search of better or cheaper products. However, "American nationism" is getting squeezed among demographic subnationalism, technological independence, and economic internationalism. I do not have any empirical evidence for my concern, and I certainly do not want to encourage reactionary nationalism; but eventually, we probably ought to pay some analytic attention to how these atomizing pressures are affecting public allegiance to our national experiment in democratic ideals. Thus, some of the central and normally positive dynamics of American life-demographic fluidity, technological progress, and an increasingly global economy-are exacerbating our civic ailment by segmenting American society and facilitating political secession from the American experiment. Those who are relatively advantaged-socially, economically, politically-are backing away from our historic experiment, retreating into regional constituencies, suburban enclaves, gated communities, with privatized schools, security, recreation, social services, and other important functions normally provided by government. And left behind are those most dependent and insistent upon the continued democratic and material blessings of our Great Experiment. .............................. THE MAGICAL MIX IS LOSING ITS MAGIC, AND AMERICA MAY BE DYING! If we accept historic America as the model of civic health, then it appears that our progressive experiment is changing dramatically as we close the Twentieth Century. Thus it is time to restate the central idea of this manuscript in the more urgent language of my "dying" inquiry: "How far can we pursue democratic ideals through limited, representative government without succumbing to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy?" It also may be time to consider whether we are flirting with those inherent, destructive tendencies. I contend that America has entered-perhaps unconsciously-an "insufficiently satisfactory" stage of civic health. Despite our current economic bonanza and Cold War celebration, our nation is developing-both procedurally and substantively-a relatively undiagnosed but serious case of democratic dysfunction. My judgement is that the American people are losing their commitment to the Great Experiment. To be more specific, I suspect (and there are increasing " dark signs of the times") that America's leaders and the public are inclining incrementally toward the less-inspired tendencies of democracy: First, we are segregating ourselves as divergent communities, constituencies, interests, philosophies, and ideologies, in various geographical areas, and at different levels and units of government; and we are de-emphasizing our "American nationism" (an essential requirement of American democracy) in favor of individualism, groupism, localism, regionalism, and transnationalism. Popularly-expressed support for democratic ideals in general remains strong, but in-depth study reveals that Americans are developing reservations about the specific application and advancement of these ideals through government (especially the national government); and political initiatives and referenda throughout the country reveal substantial and outright opposition to expansive democratic ideals. We seem increasingly impatient with American democracy's convoluted, contentious, difficult balancing of inconsistent, contradictory, confusing democratic ideals; many now favor a more structured, efficient democratic experiment with particularly preferred and absolute ideals. Some want to elevate cultural values (such as the family, religion, community, and diversity) as central elements-alongside or above traditional democratic ideals-of our national experiment. There are increasing demands for re-arranging and experimenting with America's historic framework of limited, representative governance (such as calls for proportional representation, electronic politics, and direct democracy) to accommodate our contemporary inclinations. There is a disturbing propensity for individuals, institutions, and communities to simply walk away from our experiment, abandoning the notion of a public, collective, democratic endeavor entirely or resorting to anti-democratic, illegal, or violent alternatives. Finally, we seem insufficiently concerned about the danger of these unhealthy inclinations for our historic experiment. Thus America seems to be moving, quite often consistently with certain inherent democratic principles and processes, in ways and directions that are unhealthy for American democracy. .............................. I would like to think that today's developments constitute a simple pause, or a case of temporary distemper, or a few targeted institutional adjustments, or a shifting of some of the burden of democratic progress to a broader, supportive society. In the long run, furthermore, some of these developments may be inconsequential or even therapeutic for America. Indeed, an improving economy is already proving somewhat effective in relieving some of the more superficial strains on American democracy. But, I am convinced that, as we close the Twentieth Century, American democracy is evidencing fundamental degeneration; and, altogether, these unhealthy developments are pushing America toward the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy. Eventually, without corrective action, an impatient populace may-democratically-alter our historic version of America. I share the sentiments of Jean Bethke Elshtain, who despite her faith in "democracy's enduring promise", says in Democracy On Trial : "As an American who has passed her own mid-century mark, I have never known the loss of independence, foreign armies, or occupations, but I have joined the ranks of the nervous generation. I believe we are in the danger zone. No outside power will take us over and destroy our freedom. We are perfectly capable, my nervousness tells me, of doing that to ourselves, all in the name of more freedom." (Pp. XIV-XV) .............................. In a fit of wild speculation, I can imagine our nation moving beyond simple adjustment into the far side of the danger zone-all in the name of democratic ideals. America may decide to resolve our historic fuzziness about freedom and equality with some less-than-ideal repercussions; or we may decide to incorporate contentious cultural values into our fundamental law. We may even decide to dump our limited, representative framework of governance for more responsive direct democracy. In the process, America could transform into "the United State of Amerika", a majoritarian democracy with conservative ideas about freedom and with right-wing cultural values. Alternately, we could evolve into "the Union of Socialist States of America", a heterogeneous, egalitarian, left-leaning democracy. Or, ultimately, America could die, democratically dissolving into a variety of dog-and-cat nation-states. None of these wild speculations is likely, but they serve as useful, sobering background for assessing our present predicament. It is worthwhile analysis, not idle speculation, to conclude that these are unhealthy times for America-and to worry about our Great Experiment. .............................. In short, the magical mix is losing its magic. The essential elements of that mix-our people, our politics, and our government-no longer work their collective civic chemistry the way they are supposed to. We are questioning anew our basic democratic ideals, as well as our cultural values and system of governance. By most accounts, traditional civic virtue is yielding to cynicism, frustration, and resignation. In some sectors, as we have pointed out, there are signs of even darker moods and anxieties. Sometimes noisily (as in Oklahoma City), sometimes silently (as at the Greenville County library), sometimes openly (as in California's governance by plebiscite), but, of most significance, both consciously and democratically (as in Washington's retreat from "Big Government"), America, as we have known it, seems to be disintegrating. Furthermore, our preliminary prognosis-absent further analysis, corrective treatment, and recuperative therapy-has to include, in theory, more seriously negative consequences, even national demise. Theoretically, America may be dying! .............................. LECTURE # 7: "THE CONTEMPORARY REALITIES OF OUR GREAT EXPERIMENT." (Is America really going to die?--And some alternative scenarios for our uncertain future.) My analysis thus far has shown that contemporary America is locked in a national struggle of historic significance unprecedented except by the 1860s Civil War. Our national environment and philosophical health have taken a turn for the worse, and the magical mix of American democracy has turned into a divisive, disruptive, unwinnable family fight. Victimized in the crossfire of our family fight are not only routine functions of government but also, and of critical importance, our historic Great Experiment. Ironically, we are stifling the pursuit of democratic ideals with our current efforts at achieving "a more perfect union". It really is not surprising that America has come to this point. Our "boundless continent" in many ways now resembles the "old world" of crowded peoples struggling in fixed place and time for the same limited natural and political resources. Considering the Irresistible forces of democracy and the restrained framework of governance established by our Founders, America was destined to reach the juncture at which (1) public demands for policies, services, and benefits push American democracy to the maximum of its capabilities and (2) conflicting democratic ideals, cultural values, and principles of governance disrupt the Great Experiment. Systemic overload is guaranteed sooner or later. American government and American democracy developed originally to accommodate a loose, unstructured, diverse society, which enjoyed sufficient room to breathe and experiment with different ideas about "the good life". The Founders designed a system for pursuing democratic ideals and material benefits within the framework of open opportunity and limited, representative government; and they wisely avoided the resolution of contentious inclinations into national absolutisms. In time, with relatively successful, satisfactory operation of that system, we evolved into a tradition of majoritarian democracy that accommodated minority rights. Modern America may not be exactly what the Founders had in mind, and it certainly is not perfect. But the system has worked fairly well for two centuries. The contemporary attempt to deal with ideals, values, and governance-in an environment of constricting opportunity-is a fundamental, traumatic, and risky redefinition of that system. Today's debate is dangerous because it jeopardizes the continued pursuit of democratic ideals. The search for democratic ideals-and the balancing of competing democratic strains in those ideals-is a precarious venture by itself; mixing moral and religious values and new ideas of governance Into that experiment is a toxic, explosive reformulation that makes a positive outcome virtually impossible. The philosophical civil war weakens the drive toward emocratic ideals by pitting warring faction against warring faction, with neither side interested in furthering general freedom or equality (or various other democratic ideals) because they now see specific democratic ideals as integral to their particularistic cultural values and principles of governance. Their continued warring distracts and derails the democratic movement as a common endeavor. Philosophical order has never been a rigid rule of American democracy, but as a result of today's constricted national environment and intense intermingling of ideals, values, and governance, the governmental process has become a study in disorder and dysfunction. Philosophical warriors of all types-Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, even libertarians, all hell-bent on promoting their immediate pet missions-are trashing traditional democratic icons such as the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Radical reformers are short-circuiting representative government in favor of direct democracy. Affirmative action, immigration, gun control, abortion, homosexuality, and pornography dominate our policy agenda, exacerbating more conventional democratic pursuits. Day-to-day government plods along, but important questions of public policy-such as long-term budget problems, national defense, and healthcare-are held hostage and suffer collateral damage. In the absence of acceptable progress on pressing issues, the governmental forum too often is filled with finger-pointing, symbolism, and other political games. Our political free-for-all is not limited to politicians and the governmental forum. Various segments of the American people have joined the fray in unconventional and ironic manner. We see grandparental senior citizens, permanently dependent upon a bankrupting governmental transfer payments program, angrily warning elected public officials to "keep your blankety-blank hands off social security". We see farmers, philosophically conservative and culturally apolitical, protesting the termination of public subsidies. We see minorities, historically victimized by official discrimination, parading for governmentally-decreed racial arrangements. We see religious groups, fundamentally supportive of religious freedom, fighting for governmentally-sanctioned religious activity. In fact, we see a large portion of Americans benefiting from governmental action schizophrenically dog-cussing government. It's not a very pretty picture, somewhat like watching a hatchet fight between siamese twins. .............................. AMERICA'S GREAT EXPERIMENT MAY SIMPLY HAVE RUN IT'S COURSE. It appears that America's Great Experiment may simply have run its course, that American democracy has outlived (or outgrown) its historic foundations. Our Great Experiment was designed for pursuing fuzzy democratic ideals in a favorable national environment and within a loose framework of limited, representative governance; our federal republic was not designed to work and cannot function as a democratic leviathan. America's history has shown that we "can" successfully pursue democratic ideals within the framework of limited, representative government. Our history has demonstrated also "how" we can conduct this pursuit. But now we may be in the unpleasant position of finding out "how far we can"- or, more accurately, "how far we cannot"-pursue democratic ideals without succumbing to the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy. The progressive evolution of the American system is remarkable; but there undoubtedly are realities that, sooner or later, constrain American democracy. We may have to acknowledge that today's crisis-a declining national environment and philosophical civil war, accompanied by our struggling, people, politics, and government-is straining those limits. Powerful forces of cynicism, frustration, and resignation have been building for the past half-century, and we may be coming face-to-face with the inherent, destructive tendencies of democracy. We must now ask ourselves whether our Great Experiment can continue-or will America fall to those inherent, destructive tendencies. ............................ The possibility that our Great Experiment may have run its course is eliciting a diversity of unconventional analysis and commentary. A veteran Foreign Service analyst suggests that we temper our expectations of American democracy. Graham Fuller warns, in The Democracy Trap: Perils of the Post-Cold War World (1991), that "our greatest enemy is no longer overseas but lies in the inherent contradictions of ourselves and our system" (P. 267): "No system-a few occasional benevolent dictatorships a side-other than liberal democracy is more systematically reliable in bringing about the well-being of society. But this belief, this faith, does not guarantee that the path will be permanently sustainable. It has also been the cardinal thesis of this book that our democratic values are creating increasingly severe operational dilemmas in their wake. Particular social problems, including the handling of race and ethnicity, morality, and maintenance of the social order are daunting; they may even be exacerbated by the systematic furthering of democratic practice ... If the social problems become critical enough, and the democratic order becomes paralyzed, it may result in a sharp pendulum swing toward an authoritarian solution in order to preserve society." (Pp. 266-277) Democracy becomes a trap, Fuller says, by stimulating the erroneous belief that with the end of the Cold War we are entering an automatically perfect world: "The Democracy Trap is the possibility that democracy may not simply go on getting better, but may contain the seeds of its own decline, possibly spurring an eventual authoritarian response from within our own society. Indeed, the Democracy Trap may lie in the very nature of postindustrial American democracy itself-its tendency to intensify the disorders of an unstructured and possibly decaying society-one in which the traditional binding social institutions of the past are falling by the wayside. Uncritical extension of the frontiers of democratic society and practice could mark the deterioration, rather than the maturation, of American society." (P. 2) Fuller predicts that America's faith in democracy will be tested in the next few decades as we confront neo-nationalism, perhaps even here in the United States: "But what about our Union? Washington indeed fought four bloody years in order to attain a settlement at Appomattox that preserved the Union ... Could George Bush today call in federal troops and go to war against our own population if, say, the South decided that economically and culturally it no longer wished to remain in the Union? If it undertook a referendum and freely voted for independence? Or if the Spanish-speaking parts of the United States voted for autonomy or separation? Can anyone imagine American troops today killing tens of thousands of Americans-in front of TV cameras-in order to prevent regional separation? I submit that the Appomattox solution-the use of military force to preserve the Union-is no longer tenable. Should a new attempt at regional autonomy or separation ever emerge in America-supported by a local referendum-it could no longer be stopped by force from Washington. American and world values have changed too much for that kind of violence to be wreaked ever again-at least in America-simply in the name of preserving the Union." (P. 99) .............................. Patrick Kennon, recently retired after 25 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, says that it is already too late to save American democracy. "Democracy has become marginal as a system of government," (P. XI) he writes in The Twilight of Democracy (1995). He explains that: "Far from being a divinely ordained arrow in the blue, beyond gravity, destined to rise to ever-greater heights, democracy is an earthbound, human creation subject to the entropy of all such creations. It now travels a course of declining relevance much like that of European monarchy from the power of Elizabeth I to the impotence of Elizabeth 11 ... Democracy, like the queen, is gradually ceasing to be a force and becoming a symbol." (P. 255) Kennon, declaring that the very completeness of democracy's victory as an ideology constitutes a threat, offers an exceedingly cynical preview: "The citizen who once found the meaning of life in work now finds it in consumption and leisure and 'respect'...The individual ceases to be an individual and becomes an oilman, a doctor, a woman, a black, a lesbian, an automobile worker, a teacher-a member of a group that has a claim on the national treasury, a group that is not going to have its rights trampled upon, a group that is suspicious of all other groups, a group that is willing to shut down the country if necessary. The bureaucracy is privatized, captured by special interests. It ceases to be a machine for progress and becomes a conduit for passing out subsidies. The politicians, now with no other function than to pander to the groups, mud-wrestle for a cardboard crown and a meaningless title." (Pp. 260-261) Kennon's pessimistic prediction is that "Those societies that continue to allow themselves to be administered by individuals whose only qualification is that they were able to win a popularity contest will go from failure to failure and eventually pass from the scene." (P. 263) .............................. Daniel Lazare rejects outright the limited, representational wisdom of our historic institutional arrangement; and he proposes that America junk our constitutional republic. His ideas, in The Frozen Republic: How the Constitution Is Paralyzing Democracy (1996), deserve more than passing comment: "The problem with the Constitution as it has developed over two centuries is that rather than engaging in a fundamental reordering, Americans have tried to democratize a predemocratic structure... The electorate, as a consequence, is locked in a desperate internal struggle, which, as long as Madisonian checks and balances remain in effect, can never end. The results are tortuous, yet ultimately only two outcomes are possible. Either the body politic will keel over from exhaustion or it will explode." (P. 301) Lazare claims that the Constitution was designed, purposively, to be counterdemocratic; and he proposes that we start over: "What Americans need is less faith and more thought, less willingness to put their trust in a bygone political order and a greater realization that they, the living, are the only ones capable of maneuvering society through the storm. Instead of beginning with the Constitution as the essential building block, they should realize that there are no givens in this world and that all assumptions, beginning with the most basic, must constantly be examined and tested." (P. 4) Lazare recommends that somebody-specifically California-start the revolutionary process by challenging the undemocratic nature of the U.S. Senate. He states the case for a political ultimatum: "No taxation ... without equal representation." (P. 286-287) If America accepts the change to a democratic Senate by either constitutional or political means, he says California should stay in the United States. "If not, it will go..." (P. 287) And he's confident that such a successful challenge would be followed by the toppling of an outdated constitution and system of governance. Americans should cast off their chains, Lazare says. "They have nothing to lose-except one of the most unresponsive political systems this side of the former Soviet Union." (P. 9) .............................. Robert Kaplan, an imaginative seer who has roamed America and the ends of the earth in search of the future, takes an equally disconcerting view of our destiny. "The United States is born to die," he claims. Our country will not be conquered or collapse as did earlier civilizations, Kaplan explains in An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America's Future (l998). Instead the United States will transition into a junction point for the world's most talented people. We get some idea vision of "International America" in Atlantic Monthly's introduction to his recent article " Travels Into America's Future": "Imagine a land in which the dominant culture is an internationalized one, at every level: in which the political units that really matter are confederations of city-states; in which loyalty is an economic concept , when it is not obsolete; in which 'the United States' exists chiefly to provide military protection. That is the land our correspondent glimpses, and it is no longer beyond the horizon." Kaplan glimpsed this horizon in extensive travels throughout the country, during which he saw a nation polarized ethnically, economically, and politically, where technological progress moved privileged society forward with a radically different world-view from that of their less privileged neighbors. For example, while visiting Orange County, California, he asked a routine question of political reporting- "Where's the power?" He found his answer not in any governmental building or political machine-but In the restaurant where he was having lunch: "Power was here, in this restaurant, dispersed among many more people, who were much less accountable. The issue was simply profit, disconnected from political promises or even geography. Orange County was merely a home base for the headquarters of global corporations, which could be moved in an instant-for example, in response to a tax increase." Kaplan posed a further line of blunt inquiry-"Will this place fight for its country?"... "Are these people loyal to anything except themselves?' Rick Reiff, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter from Ohio and now editor of the Orange County Business Journal, was equally direct in his response: "Loyalty is a problem...People came here to make money and enjoy the good life. In the future patriotism will be more purely and transparently economic. Perhaps patriotism will survive in the form of prestige, if America remains the world economic leader." The gist of what Kaplan heard from the Americans he talked to is that our country must change-actually it must evolve-in ways, directions, and destinations very different from the past: "They all believe that the federal power structure is waning. The massive ministry buildings of Washington, D.C., with their oxen armies of bureaucrats, are the products of the Industrial Age, when American society reached a level of sheer size and complexity that demanded such institutions. This leaden federal colossus must somehow slowly evolve into a new, lightframe structure of mere imperial oversight-for the sake of defense, conservation, and the rationing of water and other natural resources. The evolution may allow for a political silver age, though not another golden one." .............................. Apparently, then, we have reached a critical juncture in American history, a political and philosophical crossroad, a struggle for the body and soul of America. My rhetorical question ("Is America Dying?") is designed to dramatize my contention that American democracy is not producing satisfactory results and that we are losing our commitment to the Great Experiment. The fact is that American democracy no longer works the way that it is supposed to work. The American people are losing their civic spirit; the political organs of American democracy are malfunctioning; and American \ government is headed toward stroke, paralysis, or something worse. The bottom-line result is that our national experiment in democratic ideals is dysfunctioning. We therefore are questioning our basic democratic ideals and our historic framework of governance. This is a sickness of spirit and body. I do not believe that we are going to die. But it is time for us to call time-out to discuss what is happening, where we are going, and what we want America, eventually, to be. Let's start with Tocqueville's original inquiry about American democracy-"what we have to fear or hope from its progress"-by discussing some alternative scenarios for America's uncertain future. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO NO. l: DISSOLUTION. ("Death of America"?) The battle for the body and soul of America could lead to a breakup of the United States, by either peaceful or violent means. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO NO. 2: TRANSFORMATION. ("Amerika" or "USSA"?) America could be transformed, by democratic process, into a far different nation from what exists today. Simple constitutional amendment could create polar versions (or something in between) of our present system, such as a right-wing "United State of Amerika", reflecting the reactionary nazification of America, or the " Union of Socialist States of America", representing the ultimate triumph of left-wing sentiments. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO NO. 3: RESTORATION. ("New America"?) The acceptable alternative to dissolution and transformation is restoration. Even if American democracy has reached its limits, that does not preclude the continuation of healthy, limited, representative democracy. America can survive if we address our problems and discover different ways to pursue democratic ideals without succumbing to destructive tendencies. The process outlined in the final chapter of this manuscript might lead us to restoration and New America. LECTURE # 8: "'NEW AMERICA' IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM?" (How can we restore America?) Restoring the American system to its historical health is no small assignment. There are no simple solutions or secret formula for curing systemic democratic degeneration. We must, at least figuratively, go through a regenerative process of rediscovering what we want America to mean and how we want it to work. My recommendation is that we begin by focusing on the original, essential elements of America's Great Experiment. In the beginning, for example, a hodge-podge of diverse, divergent peoples committed themselves to inspired nationhood-the sense that we are all in this together; and they based their aspirations on democratic ideals instead of ethnicity , religious beliefs, cultural values or other disruptive contaminants. We might want to revisit these simple but inspiring notions. WE MUST ACCEPT AMERICA FOR WHAT IT IS (AN EXPERIMENT) AND IS NOT (PERFECTION). But, most importantly, I suggest that we accept America for what it is-an experiment that has served us well. This third essential element of America's Great Experiment has allowed us to pursue practical democratic ideals and the American dream, within the framework of limited, representative governance, fairly successfully, for over two centuries. My idea of restoration also requires that we understand America for what it is not-perfection. Our historic experiment searches for "a more perfect union"-not "a perfect union"; and America provides an opportunity for-not a guarantee of-the American dream. Robert Samuelson rightly observes (The Good Life and Its Discontents) that America unfortunately has made more public commitments than it can possibly keep, and we have become a prisoner of our expectations: "We feel like the country hasn't lived up to its promises, and we are right. But the fault lies as much with the promise as with the performance. Our present pessimism is a direct reaction to the excessive optimism of the early postwar decades. It stems from the confusion of progress with perfection. Having first convinced ourselves that we were going to create the final American utopia-an extravagant act of optimism-we are now dismayed that we haven't-a burst of unwarranted pessimism." (p. XV) Thus our governmental leadership and institutions have fallen into disrepair and disrepute. WE NEXT FIGURE OUT HOW TO MAKE THE GREAT EXPERIMENT WORK IN A CHANGING WORLD. We therefore have to figure out how to make the American experiment work-in practical rather than perfectionist terms-for a changing world. Further progression of democratic ideals will have to proceed with renewed appreciation for the fact that our Great Experiment is a messy, meandering journey toward an unreachable democratic destiny. We must now chart our course within a relatively bounded national environment; and we will have to acknowledge the evolutionary dynamics of our philosophical civil war. We also must adjust the elements and interactions of our magical mix to accommodate a more diverse populace and electronic democracy. Furthermore, we have to discover new ways, substantively and procedurally, to conduct the business of America as a national community. We have available for our use, of course, the discovery experience of our original founders; and there is evidence of clear, "rediscovery" thinking among contemporary American theorists and practitioners. For example, in the area of government, B. Guy Peters, in The Future of Governing (l996), offers a useful typology of alternative governance models (market, participative, flexible, and deregulated government) for organizing the public sector. He also suggests that we consider matching specific problems with specific solutions, in other words accomplishing particular governmental tasks with different forms of organizing and managing: "It may well be that for the provision of certain marketable services, the market model is adequate and desirable, but that same model would be totally inappro- priate for many social services, for example, education. Likewise, the participatory model would be well suited for urban planning or environmental issues but would produce difficulties for many criminal justice programs... My purpose is not so much to force choices among the alternative models of governance but to make the implications of the choices that now face governments more evident...the benefits and sacrifices should be clear in making judgements about governance." (p. l33) Peters asserts furthermore that, while politically we cannot restore the "status quo ante", basic elements of America's traditional governmental system can and should be salvaged. In response to his own question ("Can we go home again?"), he says: "Perhaps most fundamentally, analysts and citizens alike should ask which components of the old system, once abandoned, are worth saving. Clearly some critics would say absolutely nothing should be salvaged and would be quite willing to throw it all out and star anew It should be obvious by now that I am less sure of the vices of the old system or confident in the virtues of alternative replacements. The old system did place a high value on accountability and on service to the public as a whole, if not always to each individual client or customer. Those values are crucial for any public organization and should not be dismissed without adequate reflection." (p. l33) The essential point of restoration, then, is that we must realistically rethink how we "do" America and American democracy, in order to meet the requirements of a changing national environment, while respecting the basic parameters of our historic Great Experiment. .............................. THEN WE TAKE FIVE STEPS TOWARD RESTORING AMERICA. There's no such thing as a "how to" manual with full instructions for achieving "New America", but my systems analysis and model of dying America suggest a theoretic framework for proceeding with that task. So, drawing from that framework, here are five steps in the right direction: STEP 1. REBUILDING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. We cannot replace our original natural environment or endlessly expand public authority. But, perhaps, if we recognize the reality of our current predicament, we will be able to mitigate the debilitative impact of a changed national environment. We could use a little luck with social and economic recovery, and we seem to be making progress on this point. STEP 2. RESOLVING THE PHILOSOPHICAL CIVIL WAR. We first have to decide, consciously and consensually , that America is worth saving and that the philosophical civil war is killing America. Then we must resolve, moderate, or suppress our divisive arguments about democratic ideals, cultural values, and principles of governance. STEP 3. REVIVING OUR CIVIC CULTURE. Getting the American people to accept their civic responsibility is not a job for government alone; this task will take broad and lengthy attention and commitment of resources from concerned citizens, political leaders, political parties, interest groups, foundations, schools, families, churches, media, businesses, and government-all of whom must agree that restoring America and the Great Experiment is more important than their individualized agendas. STEP 4. REPAIRING OUR POLITICAL MACHINERY. Our current machinery is worn out. It will have to be repaired, or in some cases, replaced. Since we cannot return to earlier conditions of by-gone America, our media, parties, and elections must adjust to a different America. STEP 5. RE-INVENTING OUR GOVERNMENT. The term "re-invention" has a certain bumper sticker connotation, but there is an entire movement (part of the current "anti-big" challenge) dedicated to making limited, representative government work better. Re-invention will work if we accept the challenge of a changing America. "NEW AMERICA!" If we take ourselves through the cumulative experience of steps one-through-five, then maybe, with some of our old-time magic, we will discover New America and resume our Great Experiment in the next millennium.